journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

Introduction 7
had become accustomed. The Norwegian government expected to gain export markets
without losing control of the primary sector. This was what made membership
of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) – in comparison with the EEC –
attractive and meant that each Community application (in 1962, 1967 and 1970)
contained provisions granting Norway de facto permanent exemption schemes in
agriculture and fisheries. The unwillingness to accept closer political co-operation,
the extensive list of demands for special treatment and the government’s self-imposed
narrow room for manoeuvre during the negotiations led the Commission and
governments of the Six to question Norwegians interest in the integration process.
The argument is so well presented in Frøland’s contribution that further research
should clarify why the European Community undertook negotiations with the Norwegian
government at all.
The main question concerning Portugal is how successful the country’s European
policy actually was. Nicolau Andresen-Leitão’s main thesis is that Portugal
could have followed a more ambitious integration policy had it not been for Salazar’s
personal reservation about supranational institutions. Portugal had maintained
a “prudent reserve” towards European integration while there was no need to act
differently. Full participation in the in the co-operative schemes of the Organisation
for European Economic Co-operation and the European Payments Union benefited
the Portuguese economy in a number of ways, especially by boosting exports of
manufactured goods by means of preferential access to European markets, and by
promoting financial as well as price stability. This may be an explanation as to why
Portugal became a founding member of EFTA. It further helped that Portugal distanced
itself from those states requesting special treatment as ‘underdeveloped’
countries during the discussions about the industrial free trade area between October
1957 and November 1958. After the French veto, Portugal’s representatives found
themselves involved in the secret negotiations that led to the Stockholm Convention.
The favourable terms under which Portugal entered EFTA rendered any bilateral
arrangement with the EEC unnecessary. Ten months of pressure by its EFTA
partners were necessary before Lisbon requested the opening of association negotiations
with the EEC. De Gaulle’s veto of the ongoing Community-enlargement negotiations
in turn led to a strengthening of Portugal’s EFTA membership after
1963. In 1970, the third British attempt at membership forced Lisbon to face the institutional
question again. At that point, negotiating a trade agreement, instead of
associate membership, became an attractive option since the possibility of the
Community rebuffing Portugal’s EC association was higher than ever before. The
formula chosen reflected the increased international isolation of the Portuguese
government due to its continued attempts at safeguarding its overseas empire and
its unwillingness to move straight to democracy. In the meantime, EFTA membership
continued to play an important role in liberalising the Portuguese economy
and preparing it for future Community membership.
Both free trade with EFTA in industrial goods after 1961 and the free trade
agreement with the EC after 1973 played important roles in Finland’s transformation
from a backward economy to an economically-advanced industrial society.