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The Reliable Ally: Germany Supports Spain's European Integration Efforts 47
At the same time the Spanish government had expected not only vague advice
but also substantial financial support. In Madrid it had obviously been taken for
granted that the wealthy Federal Republic, Europe’s banker, would help its Spanish
friend financially out. 38 In Bonn, however, it had been decided on interministerial
level that the credit tap for Spain would be turned off. Contrary to the pleas of the
Federal ministry of Foreign affairs, the ministries of Economy and Finance had put
through not to consider Spain any longer as belonging to the developing countries
that were granted public credits. 39 As it had been decided in the treaty for economic
co-operation signed in 1961 only specific projects were to be supported in exceptional
cases. Within the frame of this treaty Spain had been granted a lump sum of
DM 220 million for the construction of irrigation plants. This gesture already had
been a concession to the German ministry of Foreign affairs, which had warned
that the German reputation was to suffer, if Erhard travelled empty-handed to Madrid
in May 1961. 40 Afterwards the representatives of the Federal ministries of
Economy and Finance steadfastly refused to grant further credits. From this time
on Spanish requests were referred to the private industry, whose commitments were
backed by Hermes-guarantees of the Federal Republic – until 1966 after all on a
scale of DM 700 million. 41
The Federal Government had already refused financial support to the economic
stabilisation efforts deployed by the Spanish government in the summer of 1959 by
referring to the own precarious situation of its budget. Neither the development
plan which depended on foreign financing and whose successful outcome ought to
have interested the Federal Republic in so far as it was conceived to prepare the
Spanish economy for the EEC, nor a more generous credit policy in France could
not persuade the hard-liners in the ministry of Finance in Bonn. As the financial
needs of the Spanish economy had to be covered in some manner, the European
coffers suited the Federal minister of Economy perfectly. 42 When Erhard was asked
by the Spanish minister of Industry López Bravo to help with raising the funds indispensable
for realising the development plan, he promised “that the Federal Republic
would continue to support most firmly the Spanish association application in
Brussels”. 43 Backing the Spanish EEC-integration policy had thus the double func-
38. PAAA Ref. 206/86: Speech by ambassador Marqués de Bolarque after the presentation of the credentials,
March 1959. As to the conviction that Spain had decided on economic reforms “confident
of an effective German support”, see “Verhandlungen wegen Verlängerung des deutsch-spanischen
Handelsabkommens vom 20.6.1960”, ambassador von Welck to the Federal ministry of
Foreign affairs, 25 February 1963 in PAAA Ref 412/354.
39. PAAA Ref 412/352: “Spanischer Entwicklungsplan”, Bonn, 19 December 1963. See also PAAA
I A 4/391: Letter by Ref. III A 5 to Ref. I A 4, 16 February 1966.
40. On Erhard’s journey to Madrid cf. B. ASCHMANN, Treue Freunde?, op.cit., pp.316 ff.
41. On the veto of the German ministry of Finances against further credits to Spain, see PAAA Ref.
412/416: “Deutsch-spanische Wirtschaftsverhandlungen”, 3 March 1961, and PAAA I A 4/318:
“Gesprächsunterlagen für den Abschiedsbesuch des Spanischen Botschafters, November 1964”.
42. PAAA I A 4/318: The economic section in the annual report for 1964 of Madrid Embassy, 19 January
1965.
43. PAAA Ref. 412/353: Record of López Bravo's journey to the Federal Republic from 2 to 10 May
1963.