Growing Together: Economic Integration for an Inclusive and - escap
Growing Together: Economic Integration for an Inclusive and - escap
Growing Together: Economic Integration for an Inclusive and - escap
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CHAPTER FOUR<br />
97<br />
Enh<strong>an</strong>cing regional fin<strong>an</strong>cial cooperation<br />
TABLE TITLE<br />
IV.2. Comparison of selected regional <strong>an</strong>d national development b<strong>an</strong>ks<br />
(In billions of US dollars)<br />
Year established<br />
EIB<br />
1958<br />
EBRD<br />
1991<br />
WB<br />
1944<br />
ADB<br />
1966<br />
BNDES<br />
1952<br />
CAF<br />
1970<br />
Total assets 563 52 283 100 331 18.5<br />
Total lo<strong>an</strong>s 482 20 120 46 218 13.9<br />
Subscribed capital 311 28 190 144 n.a. 2.8<br />
Paid-up capital 16 8 12 7 .. ..<br />
Equity 54 17 38 16 40 5.7<br />
Lo<strong>an</strong>s disbursed 2010 79 12 29 6 101 7.7<br />
Net income 2010 3 2 -1.1 0.6 6 0.2<br />
Return on equity 5.3 % 10.8 % -2.9 % 3.8 % 15.2 % 3.0 %<br />
Source: 2010 fin<strong>an</strong>cial statement of each institution.<br />
Notes: The abbreviations are: EIB: Europe<strong>an</strong> Investment B<strong>an</strong>k; EBRD: Europe<strong>an</strong> B<strong>an</strong>k <strong>for</strong> Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d Development; WB: World B<strong>an</strong>k; ADB:<br />
Asi<strong>an</strong> Development B<strong>an</strong>k; BNDES: Brazilli<strong>an</strong> Development B<strong>an</strong>k; <strong>an</strong>d CAF: Development B<strong>an</strong>k of Latin America. Data <strong>for</strong> EIB, EBRD <strong>an</strong>d BNDES<br />
converted into US dollars using market exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate of 31 December 2010: US$/Euro = 1.3412 <strong>an</strong>d US$/Real = 0.6024<br />
c<strong>an</strong> subsequently be recouped through<br />
user charges – by collecting road tolls, <strong>for</strong><br />
example. M<strong>an</strong>y governments have been<br />
keen to encourage private participation in<br />
infrastructure, seeing this as a way to reduce<br />
fiscal burdens. Consequently, since the 1980s,<br />
they have privatized some infrastructure,<br />
notably in telecommunications <strong>an</strong>d power<br />
supplies. By doing this, the state, instead<br />
of being <strong>an</strong> owner <strong>an</strong>d provider, serves as<br />
the regulator <strong>for</strong> privately provided public<br />
services. This has paved the way <strong>for</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
private-sector comp<strong>an</strong>ies to own <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>age<br />
infrastructure assets, with expectations of<br />
attractive returns.<br />
While this model has been employed<br />
extensively in developed countries, it has<br />
been slower to get off the ground in poorer<br />
developing countries, where the private<br />
sector has more limited access to funds. Such<br />
funds come from four main sources: b<strong>an</strong>ks,<br />
institutional investors, bond markets <strong>an</strong>d<br />
equity markets.<br />
B<strong>an</strong>k lending<br />
Commercial b<strong>an</strong>ks may be wary of lending<br />
<strong>for</strong> infrastructure since they are likely to<br />
face a maturity mismatch. Infrastructure<br />
requires long-term funding while the b<strong>an</strong>k<br />
funds are primarily short-term in the <strong>for</strong>m of<br />
deposits <strong>an</strong>d interb<strong>an</strong>k borrowing. Nor do<br />
b<strong>an</strong>ks necessarily have the skills to assess<br />
the risks related to such lending. Risk officers<br />
with limited experience will find it difficult<br />
to price the risk involved in infrastructure<br />
projects in which there is often a high degree<br />
of uncertainty. In these circumst<strong>an</strong>ces,<br />
when funds are offered, they are likely to<br />
be expensive. As indicated in figure IV.1, in<br />
projects with lower ratings the credit spread<br />
c<strong>an</strong> be higher th<strong>an</strong> 20 percentage points.<br />
Institutional investors<br />
An alternative to b<strong>an</strong>k funding is to seek<br />
other investors that take a longer-term view.<br />
Insur<strong>an</strong>ce comp<strong>an</strong>ies, pension funds <strong>an</strong>d other<br />
institutional investors are likely to have a more<br />
suitable asset-liability maturity structure, but<br />
this assumes that these institutions have the<br />
necessary in-house resources <strong>for</strong> acquiring,<br />
m<strong>an</strong>aging <strong>an</strong>d disposing of infrastructure<br />
assets. The Asia-Pacific region has relatively<br />
few institutions with this capacity.<br />
Bond markets<br />
In m<strong>an</strong>y countries, privately developed<br />
infrastructure has been funded by issuing<br />
bonds. In most Asia-Pacific countries, however,<br />
bond markets are either non-existent or in<br />
their inf<strong>an</strong>cy. Moreover, most projects in less<br />
developed Asia-Pacific countries are likely<br />
to be rated below a single B, <strong>for</strong> which the<br />
premia charged over government bonds<br />
c<strong>an</strong> be prohibitively high (figure IV.1). An<br />
alternative would be to issue bonds in<br />
international markets, though few comp<strong>an</strong>ies<br />
in Asia <strong>an</strong>d the Pacific have sufficient access