Mirror-touch synaesthesia: the role of shared ... - UCL Discovery
Mirror-touch synaesthesia: the role of shared ... - UCL Discovery
Mirror-touch synaesthesia: the role of shared ... - UCL Discovery
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125<br />
Chapter 7<br />
CHAPTER 7: THE ROLE OF SENSORIMOTOR SIMULATION<br />
IN AUDITORY EMOTION DISCRIMINATION<br />
Functional neuroimaging studies indicate that activity in primary somatosensory and<br />
premotor cortex is evoked during <strong>the</strong> perception <strong>of</strong> emotion. In <strong>the</strong> visual domain,<br />
right somatosensory cortex activity has been shown to be critical for facial emotion<br />
recognition. However, <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se representations in modalities outside<br />
<strong>of</strong> vision remains unknown. This study used continuous <strong>the</strong>ta-burst transcranial<br />
magnetic stimulation (cTBS) to investigate whe<strong>the</strong>r neural activity in <strong>the</strong> right<br />
primary somatosensory cortex (rSI) and right lateral premotor cortex (rPM) is<br />
central to non-verbal auditory emotion recognition. Two groups <strong>of</strong> participants<br />
completed same-different tasks on auditory stimuli, discriminating between ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong><br />
emotion expressed or <strong>the</strong> speakers’ identities, prior to and following cTBS targeted at<br />
rSI, rPM or <strong>the</strong> vertex (control site). A task-selective deficit in auditory emotion<br />
discrimination was observed. Stimulation to rSI and rPM resulted in a disruption <strong>of</strong><br />
participants’ abilities to discriminate emotion, but not identity, from vocal signals.<br />
7.1 Introduction<br />
Our ability to recognise <strong>the</strong> emotions <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs is a crucial feature <strong>of</strong> human<br />
social cognition. The neurocognitive processes which underpin this have recently<br />
been described as being achieved through simulation processes (Adolphs, 2002;<br />
Adolphs, 2003; Damasio, 1990; Gallese, Keysers, and Rizzolatti, 2004; Goldman and<br />
Sripada, 2005; Keysers and Gazzola, 2006). These models suggest that understanding<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r’s emotions requires individuals to map <strong>the</strong> observed state onto <strong>the</strong>ir own<br />
representations which are active during <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> perceived emotion. The<br />
discovery <strong>of</strong> mirror neurons in <strong>the</strong> primate brain (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, and<br />
Rizzolatti, 1996), and evidence <strong>of</strong> not only a ‘classical’ action mirror system (Buccino<br />
et al., 2001; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, and Rizzolatti, 1996; Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh, and<br />
Keysers, 2006), but also ‘extended’ mirror systems in <strong>the</strong> human brain (involved in<br />
mirroring sensation and emotion; Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, and Aglioti, 2005;<br />
Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, Frith, and Ward, 2005; Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta,<br />
and Lenzi, 2003; Keysers, Wicker, Gazzola, Anton, Fogassi, and Gallese, 2004;