Twenty-eighth Report Adapting Institutions to Climate Change Cm ...

Chapter 4
4.30
4.31
The communities in Happisburgh and the Manhood Peninsula felt they did not have
sufficient opportunity to take part in framing the issues or solutions, and so equity issues
remain unresolved (for example, the loss in value of properties that are no longer likely to
be protected from erosion and are not eligible for compensation). 12 Whether losses should lie
where they fall or be treated as broader responsibilities (and, if so, how) are difficult social
choices. Whilst conservation and human interests are by no means always in conflict in this
context, similar issues arise when considering the resources available to compensate for loss of
habitat (as required by the Habitats and Birds Directives) when contrasted with those available
to compensate vulnerable human communities.
The difficulties of ensuring equitable adaptive responses to the changing climate come about
because of the uneven distribution of the impacts. The uneven distribution of the burdens of
climate change is most devastating and most obvious at a global level, but it is also apparent at
the national level. 13 This distributional dimension of climate change is especially acute in respect
of flooding and coastal erosion, although it may arise elsewhere, for example, in increased water
scarcity or reduced access to blue or green space.
4.32 Uneven distribution can be spatial, social and temporal. Spatially, some communities are naturally
more vulnerable to coastal erosion and flooding but, more significantly in respect of institutional
arrangements, some of these communities will be protected by public defence works whilst others
will not. The planning system has an important role to play in addressing these vulnerabilities.
4.33 Socially,
whilst the evidence is complicated, a report for the Environment Agency concluded that
“more deprived populations are more likely than less deprived populations to be living within
zones at risk from flooding”. 14 Many coastal towns experience high levels of social deprivation. 15
Equally, vulnerability to the effects once flooding has occurred is unevenly distributed between
social groups. We have also received evidence suggesting that “socially marginalised communities,
institutions and sectors of lesser economic importance” lack the capacity to make proper use of
the UK Climate Projections and hence may have lower levels of preparedness. 16
4.34
Climate change is likely to increase inland and coastal flooding, and coastal erosion. There
will be locations where it is not sustainable to build or maintain defence structures. 17 Difficult
decisions will have to be taken, potentially causing dismay and disruption, which will have to
be dealt with. The deliberate abandonment of land to the sea can have beneficial effects for
nature and conservation (Figure 2-V). But unplanned coastal erosion and flooding can have
enormous impacts on property (2.64). This has received a great deal of political attention, v
but property is only part of the conundrum and those who own no land and have little personal
property may also bear costs. Intangible losses include the loss of ‘community’, business and
employment, and the disruption of health, educational and social services. As well as being
potentially unevenly distributed, these less tangible losses may be unevenly experienced, for
example by the elderly or in low-income households.
4.35 Temporally,
the impacts of climate change and of our responses are likely to extend far into the
future. Decisions taken for the current generation, for example to protect a coastline, may create
costs for future generations, especially if, as is likely, such protection encourages development on
vulnerable coastlines or flood plains. 18 The temporal distribution of the effects of climate change
raises difficult questions about intergenerational equity.
v See for example, Lord Smith, Chair of the Environment Agency, in The Times, 7 November 2009.
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