THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY2 The Lives and Opinions

SPINOZA 141
which could have no play upon reaction if reaction were thoughtlessly im-
mediate. The great obstacle to intelligent behavior is the superior vividness
of present sensations as compared with those projected memories
which we call imagination. "In so far as the mind conceives a thing ac-
cording to the dictates of reason, it will be equally affected whether the
idea be of
anything present, past, or future." 98
and reason
By imagination
we turn experience into foresight; we become the creators of our future,
and cease to be the slaves of our past.
So we achieve the only freedom possible to man. The passivity of
passion is "human bondage," the action of reason is human liberty.
Freedom is not from causal law or process, but from partial passion or
impulse; and freedom not from passion, but from uncoordinated and
uncompleted passion. We are free only where we know." To be a superman
is to be free not from the restraints of social justice and amenity,
but from the individualism of the instincts. With this completeness and
integrity comes the equanimity of the wise man; not the aristocratic
self-complaceny of Aristotle's hero, much less the supercilious superiority
of Nietzsche's ideal, but a more comradely poise and peace of mind. "Men
who are good by reason i. e., men who, under the guidance of reason,
seek what is useful to them desire nothing for themselves which they do
not also desire for the rest of mankind." 100 To be great is not to be placed
above humanity, ruling others; but to stand above the partialities and
futilities of uninformed desire, and to rule one's self.
This is a nobler freedom than that which men call free will; for the
will is not free, and perhaps there is no "will." And let no one suppose
that because he is no longer "free," he is no longer morally responsible
for his behavior and the structure of his life. Precisely because men's
actions are determined by their memories, society must for its protection
form its citizens through their hopes and fears into some measure of
social order and cooperation. All education presupposes determinism,
and pours into the open mind of youth a store of prohibitions which are
expected to participate in determining conduct. "The evil which ensues
from evil deeds is not therefore less to be feared because it comes of
necessity; whether our actions are free or not, our motives still are hope
and fear. Therefore the assertion is false that I would leave no room for
precepts and commands." 101 On the contrary, determinism makes for a
better moral life: it teaches us not to despise or ridicule any one, or be
angry with any one; 102 men are "not guilty"; and though we punish
"IV, 62.
^Cf. Professor Dewey: "A physician or engineer is free in his thought and his
action in the degree in which he knows what he deals with. Possibly we find here
the key to any freedom." Human Nature and Conduct; New York, 1922; p. 303.
^IV, 1 8, note; cf. Whitman: "By God, I will not have anything that all cannot
have their counterpart of on the same terms."
'"Epistle 43. ^11, end.