THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY2 The Lives and Opinions

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THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY
fitted better to an ancient monarchy than to a dynasty born overnight;
but he ends on a prison-rock in the sea, ruefully recognizing that he is
"the slave of the Nature of Things." Injustice
will out.
There is nothing bizarrely new in this conception; and indeed we shall
do well to suspect,
in philosophy, any doctrine which plumes itself on
novelty. Truth changes her garments frequently (like every seemly lady),
but under the new habit she remains always the same. In morals we
need not expect startling innovations: despite the interesting adventures
of Sophists and Nietzscheans, all moral conceptions revolve about the
good of the whole. Morality begins with association and interdependence
and organization; life in society requires the concession of some part of
the individual's sovereignty to the common order; and ultimately the
norm of conduct becomes the welfare of the group. Nature will have it so,
or con-
and her judgment is always final; a group survives, in competition
flict with another group, according to its unity and power, according to
the ability of its members to cooperate for common ends. And what better
cooperation could there be than that each should be doing that which he
can do best? This is the goal of organization which every society must
seek, if it would have life. Morality, said Jesus, is kindness to the weak;
morality, said Nietzsche, is the bravery of the strong; morality, says Plato,
is the effective harmony of the whole. Probably all three doctrines must
be combined to find a perfect ethic; but can we doubt which of the
elements is fundamental?
X. CRITICISM
And now what shall we say of this whole Utopia? Is it feasible? And
if not, has it any practicable features which we could turn to contemporary
use? Has it ever in any place or measure been realized?
At least the last question must be answered in Plato's favor. For a
thousand years Europe was ruled by an order of guardians considerably
like that which was visioned by our philosopher. During the Middle Ages
it was customary to classify the population of Christendom into labora-
tores (workers), bellatores (soldiers), and oratores (clergy). The last
group, though small in number, monopolized the instruments and opportunities
of culture, and ruled with almost unlimited sway half of the
most powerful continent on the globe. The clergy, like Plato's guardians,
were placed in authority not by the suffrages of the people, but by their
talent as shown in ecclesiastical studies and administration, by their
disposition to a life of meditation and simplicity, and (perhaps it
should be added) by the influence of their relatives -with the powers of
state and church. In the latter half of the period in which they ruled,
the clergy were as free from family cares as even Plato could desire; and
in some cases, it would seem a they enjoyed no little of the reproductive