International Organization for Migration (IOM)

Improving Access to Labour market Information for migrants and employers
168
country nationals in Sweden. Today the Swedish berry-picking industry is highly
dependent on seasonal migrant workers; 80 per cent of the labour force are migrant
workers (Wingborg and Fredén, 2011). When more stringent requirements were
introduced by the Swedish Migration Board in 2011 this created concern among
berry companies. The requirement of minimum wage and bank guarantees increased
the economic risk for wholesale buyers since they are required to pay minimum wage
even if there is poor access to berries. Berry companies’ dissatisfaction with the bank
guarantee led to many of them reducing their business, or using workers with tourist
visas or workers from EU countries (Wingborg and Fredén, 2011).
The Swedish system is not entirely adapted for people working only for short periods in
regard to pensions and other social security contributions (CSE, 2012). Nevertheless,
there are special rules to facilitate short work permits. If the stay in Sweden is less than
six months, the employee has the opportunity to be taxed according to SINK (special
income tax for non-residents). The SINK-tax is 25 per cent of the compensation and
benefits. This way the employee does not have to declare income in Sweden.
Irregularities
There is a lack of knowledge about the number of irregular migrants, but the majority
of the irregularly employed has, at least until recently, been failed asylum-seekers
and not immigrants who have come to Sweden looking for work (Khosravi, 2008). It
is possible that this will change with the new rules for labour migration that favour
more short-term work permits.
Although most stakeholders believe that the new system of labour migration is good,
there has been much criticism of employers abusing the system to exploit thirdcountry
workers. On the one hand, Sweden has provided a legal sector for migrant
workers that might not exist in countries with less liberal migration policies. On the
other hand, there is very little control built into the system, which opens up scope for
abuse and bad conditions for the employees (GC, 2012).
Most unions believe that the employees take the risk while the employers can abuse
the system without any sanctions. Breaking the rules by not paying the salary, not
providing insurance or other work conditions specified in the work offer is both easy
and relatively risk free for the employers. This imbalance of risk and lack of controls
has created the conditions for an increase of illegal employment and irregular
migration. When the union TCO conducted a follow-up with their member unions
in November 2011, the general picture was that the number of cases of suspected
abuse and sham contracts had increased and seemed to have become a business
concept for some employers and intermediaries such as law firms (TCO, 2012). The
abuse can be divided into two types: situations where the employer has not met the
requirements of wages and working conditions, and situations that can be described
as pure trade with work permits (TCO, 2012).
The bad conditions are difficult to expose since the migrant workers are dependent on
the employer to be able to remain in Sweden, and are unlikely to report mistreatment