historical and political thought in the seventeenth - RePub - Erasmus ...

Chapter 8. The science of politics. The Institutiones politicae
those who obey is nothing other than ‘the sacred, secure, and firm judgement
of the subjects’. 97 Reasoning vice versa, this means that where this judgement
no longer supports the supreme magistrates in office and where the people no
longer obey the orders of the magistrates, but rather follow ‘the madness of
their own lust’, the commonwealth seizes to exist and anarchy begins. 98 Thus,
while the power to command (imperium) can be acquired by several means,
including violence and arms, only power that is acknowledged, openly or tacitly,
and obeyed by those who are subjugated to it can be considered to be sovereign
power (majestas). 99 The opinions of the subjects are the pillar on which
the very existence of the commonwealth ultimately rests. 100
The nature of the commonwealth II.
Freedom, rights, and protection
Boxhorn’s concept of freedom is somewhat more sophisticated than his concept
of sovereignty. He distinguishes two important sorts of freedom: the
freedom to rule (libertas imperii) and the freedom from obedience (libertas
obsequii). 101 The freedom to rule equals to the majestas Reipublicae, that is, inde-
97 Ibidem, I.4.4, p. 26. ‘Majestas, quae vim ex obsequentibus habet, est nihil aliud quàm sanctum,
constans, & immotum judicium subditorum, quo sibi omninò persuadent, illos, qui praesunt Reipublicae,
jure ac meritò praeesse, & posse, & debere.’
98 Ibidem, II.10.8, p. 358 [364]. ‘Est autem Anarchia, quasi tu dixeris nullum Imperium, funus
ipsum, ut ita loquar, Imperii & cadaver, in quo pessimi, quorum major fere est multitudo ubique, non
jam jussa ditius sibi Magistratuum similium, sed vesanae libidinis suae impetum sequuntur.’ It is on
this account that Boxhorn could even legitimise tyrannical regimes for ‘it is even in the interest of all
good people, that rather bad people lead the commonwealth, than non at all.’ Ibidem, II.10.9, p. 358
[364]. ‘Quod omni tyrannide et corrupto Imperio majus malum est, cum omnium etiam bonorum intersit,
malos potius quam nullos Rempublicam administrare.’ In the 1586 Latin edition of Les six livres de
la république (De republica, II.1, p. 176) Bodin had claimed more or less the same thing. Where ‘there is
no one obeying or commanding, it will be anarchy rather than a commonwealth, which is worse than
the cruelest tyranny’. Quotation taken from Franklin, “Sovereignty and the Mixed Constitution”, p. 304,
with reference there.
99 Both in the Historia universalis (pp. 626-39, esp. p. 634ff) and the Metamorphosis Anglorum (p. 213ff)
Boxhorn follows Selden’s thesis that immediately after the Norman conquest of England William the Conqueror
held for a moment absolute power, but that he soon afterwards agreed to rule according to the old
laws of St Edward the Confessor, albeit with adding some new laws. Christianson, Discourse on History,
Law and Governance, pp. 24-26, and Greenberg, The Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution, pp. 149-50.
100 This was a common notion within the politica genre. See Von Friedeburg and Seidler, “The Holy
Roman Empire of the German Nation”, pp. 158-59. Hobbes is another example of a seventeenth-century
political thinker who attached great value to opinion. In his Behemoth we read: ‘For the power of the
mighty hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people.’ Hobbes, Behemoth, p. 16. See also
the previous chapter, footnote 123.
101 The normal translation would read ‘freedom to obey’. However, in my reading of the Institutiones
politicae, Boxhorn is seen to follow the natural law tradition, in which it is possible to translate libertas
obsequii as ‘freedom from obedience’. See, for example, the Digest, 8.2.32. ‘Libertas seruitutis usucapitur’,
and ibidem, 8.6.16. ‘Libertate … huius partis seruitutis.’ These examples can be found in the Oxford Latin
Dictionary (Oxford University Press; Oxford, 1982), p. 1025. I would like to thank Adrie van der Laan for
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