historical and political thought in the seventeenth - RePub - Erasmus ...

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Chapter 8. The science of politics. The Institutiones politicae
pendence or sovereignty. 102 The freedom from obedience is further dissected
into two parts: the silent freedom from obedience (tacita libertas obsequii) and
the expressed freedom from obedience (expressa libertas obsequii).
Boxhorn describes the silent freedom from obedience as the welfare of the
people (salus populi), otherwise undefined. 103 According to Boxhorn, this type
of freedom exists even under absolute rulers who are not bound to laws. 104
‘Because it can be presupposed that the people had offered power and obedience
with the common good in view, although they have not expressed it.’ 105
The implication is of course that even under the most autocratic regimes there
exists some sort of common good that people deem worthy enough to stay
obedient to their rulers, since, as we have just seen, obedience depends on the
subjects’ opinions. From Boxhorn’s theory of resistance we can deduce that
such a common good or silent freedom at least entails the mere preservation
of life. 106
drawing my attention to these examples and for his help on this subject. See also Hans W. Blom, “Vrijheid
in de natuurrechtelijke politieke theorie in de zeventiende-eeuwse Republiek”, in Haitsma Mulier and
Velema (eds.), Vrijheid: een geschiedenis van de vijftiende tot de twintigste eeuw, pp. 137-45.
102 Boxhorn, Institutiones politicae, I.5.5, p. 46. ‘Adeo, ut illa libertas nihil sit aliud, quam ea Majestas, quam
Reipublicae esse, & dici, superius demonstratum est cap. 4. itaque de ea non est hic iterum agendi locus.’
103 Ibidem, I.9, p. 47. ‘Tacita, quae in deferendo Imperio, licet non expressa, tamen semper expressa
estimatur. Est ea autem Salus populi, ut verbo dicam, ad quam conservandam, promovendam & augendam,
solo titulo accepti Imperii astringitur, quisquis Imperium accepit.’
104 Ibidem, I.5.11, p. 48. ‘Tacita illa in omnium omnino gentium, quamvis barbarum, judicio invenitur,
ac proinde earum etiam, quae unius summo Imperio, nullis legibus astricto, se crediderunt.’
105 Ibidem, I.5.12, p. 48. ‘Nam populus in deferendo Imperio, & obsequio, non potest non praesumi,
etsi non expresserit, intendisse publicam utilitatem …’ Thus, Boxhorn does not find it hard to claim that
‘the most absolute power of princes and the freedom of the people are not by nature dissociable, nor do
they come into conflict’. Boxhorn, Emblemata politica: accedunt dissertationes politicae de Romanorum Imperio
et quaedamaliae, I.2, p. 141. ‘Neque res sunt natura sua dissociabiles, aut pugnant, absolutissimum Principum
imperium, & populi libertas. Nec, quod existimant nonnulla, hoc imperium & libertas opponuntur,
à Tacito, ubi inquit; Vrbem Roman à principio Reges habuerê; libertatem & Consulatum L. Brutus instituit; sub
initium Ann. I. Certe in quovis legitimo imperio, subditis sua esse debet libertas; ac proinde etiam in illo
summo.’ In the first sentence Boxhorn paraphrases Tacitus, Agricola, III.1. ‘Nunc demum redit animus;
et quamquam primo statim beatissimi saeculi ortu Nerva Caesar res olim dissociabiles miscuerit, principatum
ac libertatem …’ Quoted from Tacitus, Opera minora. Recognovervnt breviqve adnotatione critica
instrvxervnt M. Winterbottom et R.M. Ogilvie (Clarendon Press; Oxford, 1975), p. 4. In his commentaries
on Tacitus, published in 1643, Boxhorn defends the same position. ‘Those who think that freedom and
a royal form of command are brought here into opposition by Tacitus overstep the line, neither do they
understand what the author actually means. For in every form of command, even in a principate, there
is freedom, as long as the principate stays in good condition.’ Marcus Zuerius Boxhorn, “In Tacitvm animadversiones”,
in Caii Cornelii Taciti quae exstant. M.Z. Boxhornius recensuit et animadversionibus nonnullis
illustravit (Johannes Janssonius; Amsterdam, 1643), p. 3. ‘Qui statuunt libertatem & regium imperium
opponi hoc loco à Tacito, excedunt, neque capiunt Auctoris mentem. Nam in quovis imperio, etiam principatu,
est libertas, si is quidem recte se habeat.’ See also Levillain, “William III’s Military and Political
Career in Neo-Roman Context, 1672-1702”, pp. 331-32, of whose translations I have greatly benefitted.
106 In the chapter that deals with tyranny Boxhorn asserts that every time when the defence of freedom
comes down to the defence of life itself, it is justifiable for subjects to depose of their prince, since
the laws of nature allow a person to protect his own life. Boxhorn, Institutiones politicae II.4.49, p. 305.
‘Quippe ubi in extremo discrimine libertas versatur, multis jam modis fracta & accisa, justa ac gravis
satis causa ejiciendi Principis subditis offertur, cum par ratio sit vitae & libertatis, vitam autem utique
tueri naturae & gentium omnium legibus indultum est.’ According to Wolfgang Weber, ‘the idea of the