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historical and political thought in the seventeenth - RePub - Erasmus ...

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290<br />

Chapter 8. The science of politics. The Institutiones politicae<br />

<strong>the</strong>n, express <strong>the</strong> agreement reached by deliberation, <strong>and</strong> as such represent<br />

<strong>the</strong> common consensus about a certa<strong>in</strong> issue, or, reasoned from <strong>the</strong> negative<br />

perspective of man’s ambitious <strong>and</strong> greedy character, <strong>the</strong>y articulate man’s<br />

compliance, be it out of self-<strong>in</strong>terest or fear. S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong>y articulate <strong>and</strong> represent<br />

<strong>the</strong> common consensus, it is <strong>the</strong>se fundamental laws that should <strong>and</strong> could<br />

rule, <strong>and</strong> not man’s own private op<strong>in</strong>ion. It is on this belief <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rule of law<br />

that Boxhorn’s defence of polyarchical regimes ultimately rests; <strong>the</strong> private<br />

op<strong>in</strong>ions of <strong>the</strong> many have become one <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> law, <strong>and</strong> it is this law that both<br />

regulates <strong>the</strong> relationships between subjects <strong>and</strong> rulers <strong>and</strong> those between <strong>the</strong><br />

rulers <strong>the</strong>mselves. 207 Fear <strong>and</strong> self-<strong>in</strong>terest will guarantee that both rulers <strong>and</strong><br />

subjects will abide to <strong>the</strong> laws, which <strong>the</strong>mselves are <strong>the</strong> expressions of <strong>the</strong>se<br />

fears <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests. 208 Thus, Boxhorn comes up with a Machiavellian argument<br />

to refute Machiavelli. 209<br />

The ground has now been prepared to assert that aristocracy is <strong>the</strong> most commendable<br />

form of government. Boxhorn def<strong>in</strong>es aristocracy as ‘that form of<br />

comm<strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> whole supreme power is transferred to a small section<br />

of citizens, who excel as far as descent, wealth, <strong>and</strong> especially virtue goes’. 210<br />

The ma<strong>in</strong> difference between aristocracy <strong>and</strong> democracy is not <strong>the</strong> number of<br />

persons that have been put <strong>in</strong> charge of <strong>the</strong> commonwealth; <strong>in</strong> both <strong>the</strong> number<br />

is small. 211 In a democracy, however, <strong>the</strong>se few men are chosen from <strong>the</strong> entire<br />

207 As we have seen <strong>in</strong> chapter 5, Boxhorn’s defence of pr<strong>in</strong>ce Charles’s right to <strong>the</strong> throne of Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong> 1649 ultimately also rested on this belief <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rule of law. Fundamental laws were seen as<br />

impos<strong>in</strong>g limits upon <strong>the</strong> power of rulers, <strong>and</strong> as such <strong>the</strong>y ‘were grist to <strong>the</strong> mill of outright resistance<br />

<strong>the</strong>orists’. In this sense, Boxhorn can be seen as an adherent of ‘constitutionalism’ such as described by<br />

Howell Lloyd, with this important note, that, just as Lloyd himself acknowledges, <strong>the</strong> term ‘had no currency<br />

<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>political</strong> <strong>thought</strong> of <strong>the</strong> late fifteenth <strong>and</strong> sixteenth centuries’. Lloyd, “Constitutionalism”,<br />

pp. 254-79, with quotes on p. 254 <strong>and</strong> p. 279. See also chapter 5.<br />

208 Boxhorn, Institutiones politicae, I.5, p. 59.<br />

209 See Machiavelli, Discorsi, I.4.4-6, pp. 34-35. ‘I say that those who condemn <strong>the</strong> conflicts between<br />

<strong>the</strong> Nobles <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Plebs appear to me to be blam<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> very th<strong>in</strong>gs that were <strong>the</strong> primary reasons<br />

for Rome’s rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g free <strong>and</strong> to be pay<strong>in</strong>g more attention to <strong>the</strong> shouts <strong>and</strong> cries that <strong>the</strong>se conflicts<br />

aroused than to <strong>the</strong> good results <strong>the</strong>y had. They do not consider that <strong>in</strong> every republic <strong>the</strong>re are two<br />

oppos<strong>in</strong>g humors – <strong>the</strong> people <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> upper class <strong>and</strong> that all laws to promote freedom derive from<br />

<strong>the</strong> conflict between <strong>the</strong>m. We can readily see this from what occurred <strong>in</strong> Rome: from <strong>the</strong> Tarqu<strong>in</strong>s to<br />

<strong>the</strong> Gracchi, a period of more than three hundred years, conflicts <strong>in</strong> Rome rarely <strong>in</strong>volved banishment<br />

<strong>and</strong> even more rarely bloodshed … Nor can a republic <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>re are so many examples of virtù<br />

reasonably be called disorderly, s<strong>in</strong>ce good examples derive from good upbr<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g, good upbr<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g<br />

from good laws, <strong>and</strong> good laws from <strong>the</strong> very conflicts that many people condemn <strong>in</strong>discrim<strong>in</strong>ately.<br />

For anyone who studies <strong>the</strong>ir result closely will discover that <strong>the</strong>y did not lead to any exile or violence<br />

<strong>in</strong>imical to <strong>the</strong> common good, but produced laws <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions conducive to public freedom.’<br />

210 Boxhorn, Institutiones politicae, II.5.9, p. 321. ‘Aristocratia autem ea imperii forma est, <strong>in</strong> qua<br />

<strong>in</strong> partem civium m<strong>in</strong>orem, eamque genere, censu, & virtute imprimis excellentem, suprema omnis<br />

potestas est translata.’ Compare Boxhorn’s def<strong>in</strong>ition of aristocracy with Aristotle’s def<strong>in</strong>ition <strong>in</strong> Politics,<br />

1293b1 [IV:7], p. 102. ‘The term “aristocracy” is rightly applied to <strong>the</strong> form of government which<br />

is described <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first part of our treatise; for that only can be rightly called aristocracy which is a<br />

government formed of <strong>the</strong> best men absolutely, <strong>and</strong> not merely of men who are good relative to some<br />

hypo<strong>the</strong>sis.’<br />

211 Ibidem, II.5, p. 327. ‘Ac primâ quidem fronte duo isti Reip. status vix commodè dist<strong>in</strong>gui posse

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