historical and political thought in the seventeenth - RePub - Erasmus ...

Chapter 8. The science of politics. The Institutiones politicae
evil, but also as something that can be longed for and that has a potentially
positive effect on the ‘unnatural’ bond between subjects and rulers. 194
As we have seen above monarchy is susceptible to degenerate into tyranny.
This susceptibility opens the way for a positive evaluation of the merits of
aristocracy and democracy, which Boxhorn groups together under the name
of ‘polyarchy’. The evaluation comes in the shape of a dispute with Machiavelli
about the feasibility of concord between men who are equal in power.
287
We said in theses one and two that there exists a polyarchy where more
than one person is put in charge of the commonwealth. Experience demonstrates
and learns that such polyarchies exist, and reason shows that
such polyarchies can be good. However, Machiavelli denies this with
this argument, that there is no concord among those equal in power,
and that thus nothing can be decided for the common good. 195
Although it is not quite clear to which work of Machiavelli Boxhorn is referring,
at first instance he seems to agree with the Florentine’s argument. 196 If
one looks at the number of people that hold the highest authority, Boxhorn has
to admit that a multiple number of people would not be able to govern well
since, and here he quotes Tacitus, ‘it was a condition of commanding that the
account would not balance unless it were rendered to a single individual’. 197
And had that same Tacitus not explained that ‘the body of the state was one
and needed to be ruled by the mind of one individual’? 198
194 Ibidem, I.3.15, pp. 18-19. ‘Jam verò, cum contra naturam, & primaevam hominum libertatem
sit, alteri subesse, nullumque, ut Seneca loquitur, animal morosius rectorem ferat, quàm quod caetera domat,
omnino nexum statuendum esse oportet, quo imperantes & subditi, non tantùm arctissimè, sed & libentissimè
sibi invicem devinciantur.’
195 Ibidem, II.5, p. 326. ‘Diximus § 1. & 2. Polyarchiam esse, ubi plures summae rerum praeponuntur. Esse
autem tales experientia probat, & docet, & esse posse bonas, ratio ostendit. Negat tamen id Machiavellus
eo argumento, quod nulla sit concordia inter pares potentia, et sic nihil possit pro communi boni decerni.’
196 The most likely option would be the Discorsi. There Machiavelli elaborates on the ‘ineffectualness
of masses without a leader.’ Machiavelli, Discorsi, I.44.1-5, p. 12. ‘Because of the incident of Virginia,
the Roman Plebs had withdrawn with their weapons to the sacred Mount. The Senate sent its envoys to
ask by what authority they had deserted their commanders and withdrawn onto the Mount. The Senate’s
authority was so greatly respected, that since there was no leader among them, nobody ventured
to reply. Livy says they did not lack what to say in reply but they lacked someone to give the reply.
This shows precisely the ineffectualness of masses without a leader.’ In book 3, chapter 15 of the Discorsi
Machiavelli advocates that ‘one man, not many, should have charge of an army’. He substantiates
his view by quoting Livy, The History of Rome from its Foundation, III.70.1. ‘… in the administration of
important matters, it is most advantageous for the highest power to be placed in one man.’ Machiavelli,
Discorsi, III.15, pp. 312-14, with quotes on pp. 312-13, and reference on p. 314. However, it is also possible
that Boxhorn had Machiavelli’s Istori Fiorentine (Florentine Histories, 1532) in mind, where dissensions
between and within the different (social) strata of Florence take centre stage.
197 Boxhorn, Institutiones politicae, II.5, p. 326. See also ibidem, I.8, p. 111, and I.15, p. 243, and Tacitus,
The Annals, I.6.3, p.5.
198 Ibidem, II.5.2, p. 320, and Tacitus, The Annals, I.12.3, p. 9. Here, then, just as Lipsius had done