historical and political thought in the seventeenth - RePub - Erasmus ...

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Chapter 10. Conclusion
many people from Zeeland and Leiden, Boxhorn was a supporter of the war
against Spain. 1 Why he supported the war cannot be determined for certain.
Boxhorn’s motives could have been personal, religious, professional, political,
economic, or historical. Probably it was some combination of all six of them. 2
While Boxhorn’s pro-war stand aligned him with the refugees from Brabant
and the people from Zeeland, his defence of Dutch maritime activities put him
in the camp of the fishermen and merchants of Holland and Zeeland. The importance
of Dutch maritime activities was obvious to Boxhorn. The fishing industry
provided the Dutch with jobs and income; the VOC and WIC brought the
Dutch great riches. The economic interests involved in Dutch maritime activities
might have concerned Boxhorn’s immediate circle of family and friends, and
perhaps also Boxhorn himself. 3 But although private interests may have been
involved, Boxhorn’s defence of Dutch maritime activities is best understood if
we connect it to his stand on war. To wage war, either defensive or offensive,
costs money. As Boxhorn knew, the personal wealth of subjects constituted an
important source of revenue for the public authorities, which they could use to
finance the commonwealth’s war efforts. The more wealth subjects possessed,
the larger the potential reservoir that public authorities could tap to provide
for the commonwealth’s needs. In short: in Boxhorn’s eyes a pro-fishing and
pro-commerce policy benefitted a pro-war policy, because economic prosperity
strenghtened the military prowess of the Dutch Republic. This view on the
relationship between economics and Dutch foreign policy puts Boxhorn at odds
with Pieter de la Court, who favoured peace because he believed that war was
harmful for Holland and its maritime interests. 4 Thus, while Boxhorn placed
1 The fact that in 1648 Boxhorn held an oration in which he celebrated the peace of Münster seems
to undermine this conclusion. However, the fact that Boxhorn held this oration can be explained by
pointing out that Boxhorn, as a professor of eloquence at Leiden University, could hardly openly voice
opposition against a peace that had the backing of the majority of the States of Holland, who, ‘when
it came to the crunch, were actually the highest authority’ as far as Leiden University was concerned.
Sluijter, ‘Tot ciraet, vermeerderinge ende heerlyckmaeckinge der universiteyt’, p. 51. To this we can add that the
oration of 1648 was not only a eulogy on peace; in the oration Boxhorn also made clear that the peace the
Dutch had won in 1648 was not without its dangers.
2 Personal: perhaps Boxhorn wanted revenge on the Spanish foe, who had forced him to leave
Breda. Religious: Boxhorn came from an orthodox Calvinist background. He may have seen the war
against Spain as a holy or religious war to free the Southern Netherlands and the true believers from
Catholicism. Professional: as mentioned before, it was Boxhorn’s duty as a (extra)ordinary professor
of eloquence to exalt Dutch war efforts and to legitimise or at least to excuse Dutch actions. Political:
Boxhorn saw the war as an attempt to free his fellow-countrymen from the tyranny of Spain. Economic:
as Boxhorn made clear in the Theatrum and the Historia obsidionis Bredae, the war against the enemy, at
least at sea, benefitted both the private Dutch individual and the commonwealth. Historical: Boxhorn
believed that the Northern and Southern Netherlands were once a political unity. Seen from this perspective,
the war was an effort to restore this unity.
3 It is possible, for example, that Boxhorn held shares in the WIC. According to Josua van Iperen, Boxhorn’s
father-in-law Pieter Duvelaar was a director of the WIC. Van Iperen, Historische redenvoering, redenvoering p. 178.
4 See V.D.H., Interest van Holland, pp. 63-65.