Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction - autonomous learning
Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction - autonomous learning
Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction - autonomous learning
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M o M e n t s<br />
Somme et le Reste. “We will call ‘Moment,’ ” he says, “the attempt<br />
to achieve the total realization of a possibility. Possibility offers<br />
itself; and it reveals itself. It is determined and consequently it is<br />
limited and partial. Therefore to wish to live it as a totality is to<br />
exhaust it as well as to fulfill it. The Moment wants to be freely<br />
total; it exhausts itself in the act of being lived.” 14<br />
The “moment” assumed the same gravity for <strong>Lefebvre</strong> as white<br />
spaces between words did for the poet Stéphane Mallarmé. “The<br />
blank,” the latter said, intervenes in the text to such a degree that<br />
it becomes part of the work itself. It becomes a secret door letting<br />
the reader enter. Once inside the reader can subvert each verse,<br />
rearrange its rhythm, reappropriate the poem as a covert author:<br />
“The text imposes itself,” Mallarmé wrote, “in various places, near<br />
or far from the latent guiding thread, according to what seems to<br />
be the probable sense.” 15 Mallarmé’s poetry disrupted linear textual<br />
time much as <strong>Lefebvre</strong>’s theory of moments sought to disrupt<br />
<strong>Henri</strong> Bergson’s notion of linear real time—his durée, or duration.<br />
Creation, for Bergson, is like the flow of an arrow on a teleological<br />
trajectory. “The line [of the arrow] may be divided into as many<br />
parts as we wish,” Bergson said, “of any length that we wish, and<br />
it will always be the same line.” 16 Life itself, Bergson insisted,<br />
unfolds with similar temporality, and we comprehend ourselves in<br />
his unbroken, absolute time, not in space: “we perceive existence<br />
when we place ourselves in duration in order to go from that duration<br />
to moments, instead of starting from moments in order to bind<br />
them again and to construct duration.” 17<br />
<strong>Lefebvre</strong> goes against the grain of time’s arrow of progress,<br />
building a framework of historical duration from the standpoint<br />
of the moment—from, in other words, the exact opposite pole to<br />
Bergson’s. <strong>Lefebvre</strong> hated Bergson’s guts. In La Somme et le Reste<br />
(Tome II, p. 383), he writes, pulling no punches, “If, during this<br />
period [1924–26], there was a thinker for whom we (the young<br />
philosophers group) professed without hesitation the most utter<br />
27