Section One

More documents

Recommendations

Info

in initiating fracturing jobs are common. In some areas, such as northern Europe, environmentally-driven political opposition can also be expected to slow or possibly prevent development. Outside of the US and Canada, there are at present only three basins that have been analyzed sufficiently to be viewed as having potential for near-term production. These are the Vaca Muerta in Argentina, the Beetaloo in Australia, and the Paris basin in France. The last, however, faces strong political opposition and development will likely be delayed for years. Elsewhere, China is moving aggressively to study and exploit its shale oil resources and production there is likely to start growing following a few years of evaluation and human resource training. And if other countries such as Brazil, as well as those with shale oil deposits in North Africa, encourage operations, then after around five years, perhaps small increments may also be observed from these areas. Regions such as central Africa and Siberia will not be developed soon, because of their lack of infrastructure, and regions such as the Middle East have no need at present to develop a higher-cost, unconventional resource. Development costs for shale oil appear to be roughly in the $30–$80/b range, excluding taxes and royalties. However, as the industry develops and moves further along the learning curve, costs can be expected to come down, perhaps sharply over the medium-term, before flattening out. Depletion will not be a significant factor, due to the size of the resource, but in the short-term, pressure on the limited amount of crews and equipment could drive costs up. Looking ahead, it is evident that output from new shale oil deposits will not grow at a similar rate of 60,000 b/d per year as the Bakken basin is presently, but capacity will expand for years to come as more and more rigs and fracing equipment are brought in. Within a decade, it is quite possible that shale oil production could rise at relatively significant levels year-on-year, assuming prices remain well above $60/b, and regions such as Argentina, Australia and Canada do not significantly restrict operations. At present, however, shale oil should not be viewed as anything more than a source of marginal additions. Biofuels The pattern of biofuels supply in the Reference Case follows three distinct phases. Over the medium-term, there is an initial supply surge, with first generation technologies used to supply the vast bulk of this. In the medium-term, biofuels rise from 125 Chapter 3
126 1.8 mb/d in 2010, to 2.7 mb/d in 2015 (Table 3.6). This increase is focused mainly on the US, Europe and Brazil. Increasingly, however, in the second of these phases, sustainability issues place a limitation on how much first generation biofuels can be produced. Indeed, recently, some countries have revised their policy push in favour of biofuels by relaxing their blending mandates, for example, in Germany, or by developing sustainability criteria, as seen in the EU as a whole. Higher sugar prices have also led to a downward revision of ethanol mandated blending in Brazil. Moreover, the economic crisis and the resulting pursuit of fiscal consolidation in many countries will likely make it more difficult to justify and sustain expensive support programmes that favour biofuels. This means that, after the medium-term period, the Reference Case sees a slowdown in the rate of increase. This will be particularly apparent in the US and Europe, which in turn may mean that some ambitious targets may not be met. In the longer term, the third phase, it is assumed that second generation technologies – and third generation biofuels technology, such as algae-based fuels – become increasingly economic, leading to a resurgence in biofuels supply growth. The Reference Case sees biofuels supply rising by more than 5 mb/d from 2010, to reach 7.1 mb/d by 2035 (Table 3.7). The growing importance of second and third generation biofuels over the longer term introduces considerable uncertainty to the outlook. Increases could feasibly be considerably higher, once these technologies become a commercial reality and should costs decline substantially. The development of these technologies is also likely to be sensitive to how oil prices evolve. Table 3.6 Medium-term non-OPEC biofuel supply outlook in the Reference Case mb/d 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 US & Canada 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 Western Europe 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 OECD 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 Latin America 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 Asia 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 China 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 Developing countries, excl. OPEC 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 Non-OPEC 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.7
Page 1 and 2:
Section One
Page 4 and 5:
Chapter 1 World oil trends: overvie
Page 6 and 7:
Box 1.1 Regulatory reform in the en
Page 8 and 9:
commodities, the OTC market also in
Page 10 and 11:
IHS CERA upstream capital cost MOVE
Page 12 and 13:
in the strength of the dollar: in N
Page 14 and 15:
to this, there is the dominance of
Page 16 and 17:
Although these reduced growth targe
Page 18 and 19:
Global and regional population leve
Page 20 and 21:
average of 67% of the population in
Page 22 and 23:
Table 1.3 Population by urban/rural
Page 24 and 25:
Figure 1.8 Real GDP by region in 20
Page 26 and 27:
Policies The Reference Case retains
Page 28 and 29:
electric vehicles, which focuses on
Page 30 and 31:
Box 1.5 Shale gas: recent developme
Page 32 and 33:
40 years. While the early high perf
Page 34 and 35:
Box 1.6 After Fukushima: unclear fo
Page 36 and 37:
is Japan itself, which has been ask
Page 38 and 39:
Figure 1.13 Fossil fuel use per cap
Page 40 and 41:
Table 1.6 Medium-term Reference Cas
Page 42 and 43:
Table 1.7 World oil demand outlook
Page 44 and 45:
low, and well below levels seen in
Page 46 and 47:
has also taken into account the pot
Page 48 and 49:
stronger than previously expected s
Page 50 and 51:
d 0 Conventional Figure 1.22 US & C
Page 52 and 53:
Upstream investment Figure 1.25 mb/
Page 54: different picture. By 2035, Annex I
Page 57 and 58: 78 0 Figure 2.2 The distribution of
Page 59 and 60: 80 Table 2.1 Vehicle and passenger
Page 61 and 62: 82 0 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990
Page 63 and 64: n (millions) 7,000 84 0 China Brazi
Page 65 and 66: ion (millions) 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,
Page 67 and 68: 88 Conventional powertrain technolo
Page 69 and 70: 90 acquisition costs, and the lower
Page 71 and 72: 92 Figure 2.9 Increase in oil consu
Page 73 and 74: 94 rose by an average of more than
Page 75 and 76: 96 Table 2.10 Oil demand in rail an
Page 77 and 78: 98 Table 2.13 Oil demand growth in
Page 79 and 80: 100 Table 2.14 Oil demand in the pe
Page 81 and 82: 102 2.5 2.0 10 1.5 81.0 60.5 0 mboe
Page 83 and 84: 104 Figure 2.15 Share of industry i
Page 85 and 86: 106 Figure 2.16 Figure 2.16 Oil use
Page 87 and 88: 108 Table 2.19 Oil demand growth in
Page 89 and 90: 110 from 63% to 10% in Southeast As
Page 91 and 92: 112
Page 93 and 94: 114 In Canada, although the Outlook
Page 95 and 96: 116 Non-OPEC Latin America’s prod
Page 97 and 98: 118 additional supply of 180,000 b/
Page 99 and 100: 120 limiting factor for feasible su
Page 101 and 102: 122 Table 3.4 Medium-term non-OPEC
Page 103: 124 some deposits will not be suffi
Page 107 and 108: 128 Of utmost importance, in respec
Page 109 and 110: 130 influences and, therefore, brin
Page 111 and 112: 132 early support given to Brazil
Page 113 and 114: 134 the call on OPEC crude by 2035
Page 115 and 116: 136 us to cooperate to lay the foun
Page 117 and 118: 138 Figure 4.1 Table 4.6 Oil supply
Page 119 and 120: 140 COP-16, held in Cancun at the e
Page 121 and 122: 142 in Article 4, paragraph 8, of t
Page 123 and 124: 144 identifies sustainable long-ter
Page 125 and 126: 146 Beyond the oil sector, there ar
Page 127 and 128: 148 other international research an
show all

Section One

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?