Section One

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Table 3.2 Estimates of world crude oil and NGLs resources billion barrels OPEC Non-OPEC Total world Cumulative production to 2009 (a) 437 627 1,063 Proved reserves (b) 1,064 273 1,337 Reserves to be added ultimately (c) 553 513 1,066 Of which: Reserves growth 342 163 505 Discoveries yet to be made 211 350 561 Original Endowment (a) + (b) + (c) 2,054 1,413 3,465 Sources: USGS World Petroleum Assessment 2000, OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2009, IHS PEPS database, Secretariat estimates. possible guide to the future. The R/P ratio, using the current levels of global production and the current estimates of global proven reserves for 2009, amounts to just 43 years. For non-OPEC, it is in fact, less than 15 years. Interpreting this ratio (incorrectly) as a guide to future supply potential, suggests that for the non-OPEC ratio to remain at this level, non-OPEC production must immediately fall. Even at the global level, supply would need to plateau within this decade. Of course, however, this calculation ignores future reserves to be added. Taking figures from Table 3.2, it is evident that using the remaining reserves, including not only proven reserves, but also those reserves expected to be added in the future, then the global R/P ratio is 84 years. This ratio can then be used in the estimation of feasible longterm production profiles. The R/P ratio is calculated for all countries and regions to develop long-term production paths, in accordance with observable trends, and consistent with ratios gradually declining. These declines, however, cannot continue indefinitely. An R/P ratio of zero implies an infeasible production path; one that suddenly comes to a standstill. Instead, the rate of decline must taper off and eventually lead to stable R/P ratios over the long-term. This, in turn, gives rise to long-term production paths that are feasible, given URR estimates. Clearly there is no unique R/P path: any number of assumptions can be made. Nevertheless, within the constraint that downward trends must eventually decelerate there emerges a clear picture of whether, and where, the resource base acts as a 119 Chapter 3
120 limiting factor for feasible supply paths. This analysis becomes increasingly important the further the projection extends into the future. The long-term Reference Case projections for non-OPEC crude oil plus NGLs supply up to 2035 are shown in Table 3.3. Output from all OECD regions continues to fall. By 2035, OECD supply from these conventional sources has fallen by close to 6 mb/d compared to 2010. This persistent decline is implied by the assumed levels of URR. It is important to note that shale oil resources are not included in the estimates of the conventional oil resource base. The outlook for some developing country regions is positive. For this decade, supply levels in these regions will not be severely affected by a lack of resources. However, in the post-2020 period, a steady decline in Asia, non-OPEC Middle East and Africa is to be expected, due to the resource constraint. Resources in Latin America, however, are sufficient to allow production to rise until the middle of the next decade, followed thereafter by only a gentle decline. This means that the region, mainly due to Brazil, will remain the largest supplier of conventional oil in developing country regions, outside of OPEC. In the Reference Case, these regional developments mean that developing country production of crude oil and NGLs will continue to increase Table 3.3 Non-OPEC crude oil and NGLs supply outlook in the Reference Case mb/d 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 US & Canada 9.4 9.1 8.5 7.9 7.4 6.8 Mexico 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.6 Western Europe 4.1 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 OECD Pacific 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 OECD 17.0 15.7 14.5 13.3 12.3 11.2 Latin America 4.1 4.9 5.7 5.9 5.7 5.4 Middle East & Africa 4.2 4.3 4.2 3.9 3.6 3.4 Asia 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.7 3.3 3.0 China 4.1 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.1 DCs, excl. OPEC 16.0 16.9 17.5 17.0 15.9 14.9 Russia 10.1 10.2 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 Other transition economies 3.2 4.0 4.4 4.7 5.1 5.5 Transition economies 13.4 14.2 14.8 15.1 15.5 15.9 Non-OPEC 46.3 46.8 46.8 45.4 43.8 42.0
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Section One
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Chapter 1 World oil trends: overvie
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Box 1.1 Regulatory reform in the en
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commodities, the OTC market also in
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IHS CERA upstream capital cost MOVE
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in the strength of the dollar: in N
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to this, there is the dominance of
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Although these reduced growth targe
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Global and regional population leve
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average of 67% of the population in
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Table 1.3 Population by urban/rural
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Figure 1.8 Real GDP by region in 20
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Policies The Reference Case retains
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electric vehicles, which focuses on
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Box 1.5 Shale gas: recent developme
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40 years. While the early high perf
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Box 1.6 After Fukushima: unclear fo
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is Japan itself, which has been ask
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Figure 1.13 Fossil fuel use per cap
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Table 1.6 Medium-term Reference Cas
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Table 1.7 World oil demand outlook
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low, and well below levels seen in
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has also taken into account the pot
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Page 50 and 51: d 0 Conventional Figure 1.22 US & C
Page 52 and 53: Upstream investment Figure 1.25 mb/
Page 54: different picture. By 2035, Annex I
Page 57 and 58: 78 0 Figure 2.2 The distribution of
Page 59 and 60: 80 Table 2.1 Vehicle and passenger
Page 61 and 62: 82 0 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990
Page 63 and 64: n (millions) 7,000 84 0 China Brazi
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Page 67 and 68: 88 Conventional powertrain technolo
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Page 71 and 72: 92 Figure 2.9 Increase in oil consu
Page 73 and 74: 94 rose by an average of more than
Page 75 and 76: 96 Table 2.10 Oil demand in rail an
Page 77 and 78: 98 Table 2.13 Oil demand growth in
Page 79 and 80: 100 Table 2.14 Oil demand in the pe
Page 81 and 82: 102 2.5 2.0 10 1.5 81.0 60.5 0 mboe
Page 83 and 84: 104 Figure 2.15 Share of industry i
Page 85 and 86: 106 Figure 2.16 Figure 2.16 Oil use
Page 87 and 88: 108 Table 2.19 Oil demand growth in
Page 89 and 90: 110 from 63% to 10% in Southeast As
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Page 93 and 94: 114 In Canada, although the Outlook
Page 95 and 96: 116 Non-OPEC Latin America’s prod
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Page 101 and 102: 122 Table 3.4 Medium-term non-OPEC
Page 103 and 104: 124 some deposits will not be suffi
Page 105 and 106: 126 1.8 mb/d in 2010, to 2.7 mb/d i
Page 107 and 108: 128 Of utmost importance, in respec
Page 109 and 110: 130 influences and, therefore, brin
Page 111 and 112: 132 early support given to Brazil
Page 113 and 114: 134 the call on OPEC crude by 2035
Page 115 and 116: 136 us to cooperate to lay the foun
Page 117 and 118: 138 Figure 4.1 Table 4.6 Oil supply
Page 119 and 120: 140 COP-16, held in Cancun at the e
Page 121 and 122: 142 in Article 4, paragraph 8, of t
Page 123 and 124: 144 identifies sustainable long-ter
Page 125 and 126: 146 Beyond the oil sector, there ar
Page 127 and 128: 148 other international research an
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Section One

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