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Railway Reform: Toolkit for Improving Rail Sector Performance - ppiaf

Railway Reform: Toolkit for Improving Rail Sector Performance - ppiaf

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<strong><strong>Rail</strong>way</strong> <strong>Re<strong>for</strong>m</strong>: <strong>Toolkit</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Improving</strong> <strong>Rail</strong> <strong>Sector</strong> Per<strong>for</strong>mance<br />

5. Creating the Industry Structure<br />

• Option 5: the state privatizes the separated rail-freight company, partially<br />

or wholly; privatization variants include an initial public offering<br />

(IPO), trade sale, or concession. If national capacity is sufficient to offer<br />

and regulate access to the public rail network, privatization of rail freight<br />

is entirely consistent with continued state ownership and control of the<br />

railway network. Privatizing the public rail-freight operator on an exclusive<br />

basis may be justified (variant in Box 5.5) if the market is insufficient<br />

to support on-rail competition. But if freight-rail competition is favored,<br />

a case can be made <strong>for</strong> a period of exclusivity be<strong>for</strong>e implementing a policy<br />

of track access rights, which would allow enough time <strong>for</strong> a company<br />

accustomed to public sector constraints to prepare <strong>for</strong> the rigors of competition.<br />

• Option 6: introduce a degree of competition in the rail-freight market<br />

through specific or general track access rights <strong>for</strong> qualified private freight<br />

train operating companies. This option offers direct market competition<br />

if justified by the scale of the freight market, but it can result in uneconomic<br />

market fragmentation in countries with lower freight density. In<br />

principle, third-party access rights can coexist with continuing public<br />

sector rail freight operation; EU countries are an example. But, new private<br />

operators can cherry pick the most profitable public operations,<br />

leaving the public rail-freight operator with a financially unsustainable<br />

traffic mix, in part because a public operator is less commercially agile<br />

and has more institutional constraints. Instead, a more commercially rational<br />

re<strong>for</strong>m strategy is to first privatize the state rail company (option<br />

5) and then introduce rail-freight competition (option 6). This would allow<br />

the state to sell its ‘cherries’ be<strong>for</strong>e other operators are encouraged to<br />

pick them.<br />

• Option 7: cause a vertical separation of national railway infrastructure<br />

from all the entities offering train services. Box 5.5 presumes prior separation<br />

of local passenger services and rail freight, and would require corporate<br />

separation of inter-city passenger services into one or more intercity<br />

train operating companies. Horizontal separation of inter-city passenger<br />

companies under public ownership may provide more commercial<br />

independence and market focus. Also, establishing a free-standing rail<br />

network company may provide a more independent and neutral framework<br />

to administrate a fair and transparent track access regime, although<br />

it is certainly not essential to implementing track access arrangements.<br />

• Option 8: maximize the diversification of the public framework with<br />

competition and private participation. Privatize inter-city passenger train<br />

operations through franchise or concession—as a single operation, by region,<br />

or by corridor.<br />

Box 5.5 shows that public ownership and railway network control are compatible<br />

with a diverse, market-oriented, competitive industry structure that has substantial<br />

private participation. Box 5.5 shows that a coherent re<strong>for</strong>m program can be<br />

built from re-sequencing priorities and creating variants.<br />

The World Bank Page 82

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