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Railway Reform: Toolkit for Improving Rail Sector Performance - ppiaf

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<strong><strong>Rail</strong>way</strong> <strong>Re<strong>for</strong>m</strong>: <strong>Toolkit</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Improving</strong> <strong>Rail</strong> <strong>Sector</strong> Per<strong>for</strong>mance<br />

9. Setting the Regulatory Framework<br />

aged to establish independent regulation, other solutions may be required, at<br />

least in the shorter term, until obstacles can be overcome.<br />

9.2 The Public Interest<br />

Regulatory intervention is required if the public interest is expected to differ materially<br />

from the commercial interests of service providers—usually private companies.<br />

This situation is often referred to as ‘market failure.’<br />

The public interest is compromised if the market fails to deliver on government<br />

objectives, such as national security, national cohesion or social policy objectives.<br />

It is then up to the government to set out what it requires the railways to do and<br />

to pay <strong>for</strong> the cost of doing so. These are essentially public sector obligations<br />

(PSOs). Administering public sector obligations is a <strong>for</strong>m of regulation, but since<br />

this is discussed in Chapter 8, it will not be repeated in this chapter. Instead, this<br />

chapter focuses on regulating railways’ monopoly power and developing competition,<br />

safety and environmental regulations, and establishing technical standards.<br />

Aspects of public interest that must be considered in designing rail sector regulatory<br />

systems are discussed in the following sections.<br />

9.2.1 Economic issues<br />

Most economic regulation in the railway sector is designed to address two issues:<br />

(i) monopoly, particularly natural monopoly; and (ii) managing industry interfaces,<br />

usually at the point of separation between the natural monopoly and the<br />

rest of the industry.<br />

Monopoly<br />

The most common <strong>for</strong>m of market failure in railways arises from monopoly<br />

power. <strong><strong>Rail</strong>way</strong> companies may dominate certain markets and usually have a<br />

natural monopoly, at least <strong>for</strong> infrastructure. 79 In the rail sector, it is rarely possible<br />

to create competition in infrastructure provision due to the economies of density<br />

required to sustain the business—average cost declines as corridor volumes<br />

rise (see Chapter 3). Also, when inter-modal competition and intra-modal competition<br />

between railway undertakings are weak, regulation may be needed to<br />

protect the final customer and perhaps to ensure that all competitors or potential<br />

competitors have fair access to facilities owned by incumbents. Economic regulation<br />

should be designed to replicate a competitive environment to the extent possible.<br />

79 A natural monopoly is an entity whose average costs decline with output.<br />

The World Bank Page 129

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