monitoring
monitoring
monitoring
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UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE<br />
• Sharable technical security principles, practices, and technologies for sites, materials,<br />
and components<br />
• Site declaration and portal <strong>monitoring</strong><br />
• “Assurance Volume” concepts<br />
U.S Modernization Programs<br />
Key Finding: DoD and DOE are starting to invest heavily in nuclear offense force and facility<br />
modernization. The Task Force found only limited consideration being given to more intrusive<br />
inspection regimes expected in future treaties and agreements, as part of the new design<br />
activities in each Department.<br />
Recommendation: State/AVC, DOE/NNSA, and DoD/Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics<br />
(AT&L) should review current U.S. facility and weapon system modernization programs and<br />
instruct program managers, if necessary, to plan for accommodation of greater transparency<br />
measures. Methods for red teaming and performing vulnerability assessments should be<br />
developed and exercised routinely, for both existing and planned facilities, systems, and<br />
operations.<br />
Unilateral Measures: Key Findings and Recommendations<br />
Principal Finding: The guiding principle for <strong>monitoring</strong> to detect undesirable nuclear activity<br />
should be detection of activities as early in the planning and acquisition of a capability as<br />
possible in order to provide the greatest number of options for slowing or reversing the effort.<br />
New intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies, demonstrated in recent<br />
conflicts, offer significant promise for <strong>monitoring</strong> undesirable nuclear activity throughout the<br />
world. The nature of these technologies in the context of the <strong>monitoring</strong> challenge, however, is<br />
that the technologies are most effective when applied in an integrated architecture.<br />
Recommendations: The IC (led by the National Counterproliferation Center [NCPC]),<br />
DOE/NNSA, DoD/DTRA and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Domestic Nuclear<br />
Detection Office (DNDO), should develop a joint roadmap, supported by the necessary systems<br />
analysis and engineering capabilities 2 , to implement an integrated, more comprehensive and<br />
responsive <strong>monitoring</strong> architecture for nuclear weapons activities worldwide, expanding upon<br />
the more general, but static approaches currently employed. The roadmap should make clear<br />
the lead and support roles for all involved. As the legislated interagency lead for the Global<br />
Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), DNDO should incorporate this more expansive<br />
<strong>monitoring</strong> architecture into the GNDA. The <strong>monitoring</strong> architecture should be structured to:<br />
2 See next section “Address the Problem Whole.”<br />
DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Executive Summary| 5<br />
Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies<br />
UNCLASSIFIED