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UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Figure 4‐1 Elements of an M&V Analytical Methodology A common issue in the development of analytical frameworks has been the tendency to frame the problem and solution together. The conflation of “problem space” and “solution space” brings with it several consequences: • It tends to promote metrics and assessments that support optimized subsystem or component performance vs. system performance by assuming they are one and the same. • It tends to lead analysts to fixate on a narrower problem (such as detector performance) rather than assessing those issues in the context of the larger whole. • It does not enable a common understanding of the problem space itself, allowing solutions to be framed in whatever manner the solution proponent deems suitable. All of these symptoms run counter to enabling the decision maker to achieve his/her ultimate goal: rendering and defending a provably effective investment strategy for M&V capability development. Separating the “problem space” from the “solution space” and analyzing them independently can therefore yield benefits by eliminating or mitigating these issues. To illustrate the point, consider that detection systems have often been placed at the forefront of the national strategy for detecting the illicit movement of nuclear threats in proliferation regimes. While undoubtedly detectors play a role in the solution, the bulk of current analytical activities are focused on detector system performance. As a result, the M&V problem of detecting illicit movements is often miscast implicitly as a detector problem. This can lead to the line of thinking that more detectors with better detector performance parameters must logically provide reduced risk – a statement that may or may not be true. More importantly, other options that do not hinge on detector deployments may in fact provide more cost effective mechanisms for risk reductions. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 4: Address the Problem | 40 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 4.3. Proposed Problem Space Description While there are several possible frameworks for describing the M&V problem space, the Task Force chose to use one based on scenarios, defined here as follows: A scenario is an evolution of the world through a series of incremental events from its current status towards an outcome of interest that is specified by the analyst. However, the Task Force did not adopt a scenario‐based planning approach because of: the pitfalls of drawing conclusions from a too narrowly defined set of scenarios, especially if they represent the analysts’ or decision makers’ “favorites”; or conversely, the unwieldy nature of systematically analyzing too many scenarios. Instead the Task Force developed a scenario framework that attempts to encompass a large portion of the potential scenario space in order to address the totality of M&V problem complexity. A scenario framework for scenario generation and analysis is desirable primarily because it enables the examination of a family of scenarios, rather than a small set of independent and specific scenarios. It also provides a systematic method for decomposing scenarios into discrete nodes and linkages, and capturing the interdependencies between individual scenarios. Finally, it lays the foundation for a bridging methodology, or systematic mapping between the problem space and solutions space, that enables increased traceability between planner objectives and solution performance. The scenario framework developed by the Task Force for M&V started with the construction of a number of simple scenarios characterized by key nodes (events) and associated linkages. One such scenario, initiated by the collapse of a nuclear weapons state’s security system, is illustrated in Error! Reference source not found.. The Task Force proceeded to construct as exhaustive of a set of such scenarios as it could think of, using this node‐linkage approach. 25 The effort yielded both a practically complete description of the M&V challenge, as well as the identification of shared nodes and pathways among scenarios. The complete scenario framework (plus a readable, large format version in Appendix A) is illustrated in Figure 4‐2. Figure 4‐2 Example Node Sequence 25 This task force built upon previous work for OSD/NCB/NM by the DOE/NNSA laboratories: “Analysis of Capability Options for the DoD Countering Nuclear Threats Mission: NNSA Tri‐lab Phase 1 Summary,” Sandia National Laboratories report SAND 2011‐7985, November 2011. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 4: Address the Problem | 41 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
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