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UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE List of Figures Figure ES‐1 Plan for Long‐Term Engagement and Commitment ................................................... 3 Figure 1‐1 Challenges are Further Compounded by What Needs to be Monitored ................... 15 Figure 1‐2 Scope – and Opportunities – of Future Monitoring Regimes ..................................... 17 Figure 1‐3 Meeting the Future Monitoring Challenge: Two “Whats” and Three “Hows” .......... 18 Figure 4‐1 Elements of an M&V Analytical Methodology ........................................................... 40 Figure 4‐2 Example Node Sequence ............................................................................................ 41 Figure 4‐3 Scenario Framework of M&V ..................................................................................... 42 Figure 4‐4 Example Decomposition Map ..................................................................................... 45 Figure 5‐1 Improve Tools: Both Cooperative and Unilateral Measures Rely on Monitoring Tools to “Access‐Sense‐Assess‐Iterate” ................................................................. 53 Figure 5‐2 Physics of SNM Detection ........................................................................................... 54 Figure 6‐1 Dual Capable (DC) Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) ‐ An Example to Illustrate Synergies in our Approach ...................................................................................................... 71 Figure 6‐2 Dual Capable (DC) Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) ‐ Some Specific M&V Approaches for Monitoring ........................................................................................................ 72 Figure A‐1 Elements of an M&V Analytical Methodology ........................................................... 79 Figure A‐2 Example Node Sequence ............................................................................................ 81 Figure A‐3 Proposed Scenario Framework .................................................................................. 83 Figure A‐4 Example Decomposition Map .................................................................................... 87 DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED Table of Contents| v
UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Executive Summary The Defense Science Board Task Force on Assessment of Nuclear Treaty Monitoring and Verification Technologies was established to examine a broad range of questions concerning the capability of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Intelligence Community (IC) to support future monitoring and verification of nuclear nonproliferation and arms control treaties. The Terms of Reference (TOR) for the study, found in Appendix B, state the tasking. Given the breadth of the topics of interest to our sponsoring leadership and the time and resources available, the Task Force determined to focus on those aspects of the TOR that address what it views as the priority issue––namely, monitoring for proliferation. Assessments of strategies for monitoring nuclear activities in both permissive and non‐permissive environments, and of our current technical capabilities and future requirements for successfully implementing those strategies, were made. A Nuclear Future Unlike the Past and the Need for a Monitoring Paradigm Shift Too many factors have changed, and are changing from our historic basis and experience developed throughout the Cold War. The list of factors that should give national leadership pause for concern is extensive, and includes the following: • The actual or threatened acquisition of nuclear weapons by more actors––with a range of motivations, capabilities, and approaches––is emerging in numbers not seen since the early days of the Cold War. Many of these actors are hostile to the U.S. and its allies, and of greater worry, they do not appear to be bound by established norms nor are they deterred by traditional means; • In some cases, nuclear forces are seen as the most affordable and effective alternative to deter superior conventional forces; i.e., nuclear weapons are viewed as a legitimate warfighting capability, especially if vital domestic or regional security interests are threatened; • Fundamental nuclear knowledge is widespread and know‐how increasingly accessible. o At the same time, ubiquitous information access and widespread observational tools are increasing inherent transparency; o However, recognition of such increased transparency by potential or actual proliferants incentivizes the employment of more sophisticated methods of denial and deception; • The pathways to proliferation are expanding to include networks of cooperation among nations and actors who would otherwise have little reason to do so; • The growth in nuclear power worldwide offers more opportunity for “leakage” and/or hiding small programs. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Executive Summary| 1 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
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