monitoring

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DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Figure 1‐2 Scope – and Opportunities – of Future Monitoring Regimes
Managed as a whole, synergies can be developed in both the horizontal and vertical dimensions
of the purpose vs. means matrix. Horizontally, for example, non‐compliance with the
provisions of a treaty might involve hiding assets or undertaking covert operations that nonnegotiated/unilateral
monitoring can uncover. Challenge inspections negotiated in a treaty can
be triggered by non‐negotiated monitoring data. Similarly, “general‐purpose” monitoring for
threat assessment (lower right) can be complemented by understanding treaty‐limited items or
behaviors learned through negotiated monitoring (lower left).
Vertically in Figure 1‐2, an overall assessment of threats of proliferation or threats by
proliferators constitutes the context in which future treaties should be proposed and
negotiated. Conversely, observed non‐compliance with a treaty can serve as a form of strategic
warning in the threat assessment sense. As a more particular example, monitoring for “patterns
of life” of nuclear operations in a particular nation (lower right) can indicate or reveal the
presence of evasive/covert operations intended for non‐compliance with treaties (upper right,
moving to upper left).
Figure 1‐2 also illustrates a separate monitoring approach for each of several nations to
indicate, as discussed above, that nuclear activities can be both unique to each and increasingly
DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 1: The Problem | 17
Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies
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