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UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE nuclear weapon state, thereby proliferating not only weapons possession, but also technology and knowledge. Each scenario node could play an elemental role in many other scenarios – e.g., the theft of a weapon could be a common step in several distinct scenarios. The nodes are therefore linked in a network of connections that becomes a framework for systematically developing and analyzing an entire family of scenarios in the M&V problem space. Figure A‐2 illustrates the complete scenario framework, rotated to fit the page, while Appendix B provides a larger view of the framework. As shown in Figure A‐3, scenarios generally evolve as one traces from top to bottom, following the directed graph towards consequences. The left side demonstrates scenarios that can lead to movement of weapons themselves from NWS to other actors. The center details scenarios that can lead to the proliferation of NW technology and knowledge, and the right hand side covers compromise of weapons usable nuclear material (WUNM) and associated technology. The long vertical chain in the middle‐right illustrates the evolution of non‐state actors towards unconventional attack with nuclear weapons. Consequences in the scenario framework include blackmail, attack, or simply the emergence of a new nuclear‐armed state. Within the scenario framework, blue‐colored nodes indicate “macro” nodes, or nodes that are easily decomposed into a common set of sub‐nodes. For the purposes of this work, the only set of sub‐nodes explored is the “movement sub‐space.” This sub‐space corresponds to movement through the origin region, across international boundaries, through global commons, and into the target region. The movement sub‐space is laid out in the blue box on the right hand side of the framework diagram. Real‐world events could easily be interpreted as a signal that a scenario in the framework is playing out, although there is actually no nefarious activity. It is very important to consider these degenerate scenarios, in addition to actual threat scenarios, when analyzing potential solutions as it is likely the bulk of actual signals and information will be from situations that are not actually leading to nuclear attacks. For example, the nuisance alarm problem in radiation detectors that are <strong>monitoring</strong> commerce streams plays a large role in the overall cost, effectiveness, and operation of those systems. Operational and analytical understanding of such false positives leads to an understanding of the full suite of information and analysis required for high confidence detection. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Appendix A: Unabridged Description | 82 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Figure A‐2 Proposed Scenario Framework DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Appendix A: Unabridged Description | 83 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
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