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UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Chapter 4. Address the Problem “Whole”: A National Approach through a Systems Team 4.1. Introduction Monitoring and verification for proliferation present a set of challenges that are difficult both technically and operationally. Progress and efficient use of resources in both domains should rely on solid, on‐going analysis, but the analytical scope and complexity are no less challenging themselves. Many of the analytical challenges associated with M&V have been addressed in the past within the framework of historical treaties and agreements, which have often been unique to specific problem areas and definitions (such as detection limits, surveillance methods, and treaty details). As planners consider how the U.S. should address <strong>monitoring</strong> and verification missions in the future, new technologies, treaties, agreements, policies, and proliferators will change the landscape of capability requirements and continue to add complexity. The Task Force believes that experienced professionals in the area should not continue to address the problem as an extension of approaches used in the past treaties and agreements. To better address the future <strong>monitoring</strong> challenge, the Task Force believes that there is a need to establish an enduring yet adaptable holistic methodology that encompasses the totality of the problem and solution space, along with the analytical capability for exercising that methodology, for guiding and facilitating the creation of roadmaps and plans for M&V DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 4: Address the Problem | 38 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE capabilities as well as for evaluating developing capabilities. In other words, addressing the future M&V challenges demands a systems approach. Moreover, execution of a systems approach would be most effectively accomplished through a “national” team to help provide a high degree of unanimity and coherence of purpose among the numerous and disparate agencies involved. The Task Force also recognized that while easy to recommend a systems approach, it is much more difficult to do––and do well. We therefore challenged ourselves to see if we could provide an example and potential starting point for the community to understand the problem in its full breadth, depth, and extent, and to offer guidance on the path forward. This chapter provides an abridged version of those results, which are detailed more fully in Appendix A. 4.2. Elements of an M&V Analytical Methodology Several key elements are proposed as necessary parts of an enduring M&V analytical methodology, as laid out in Figure 4‐1. • First, there is the “problem space,” which consists of a set of frameworks that describe the M&V challenge independent of any proposed solutions. The problem space provides the basis that will serve as a common foundational understanding for solutions to be built upon and assessed for effectiveness. • Second is the “solution space,” in which proposed capability architectures are crafted. These architectures are collections of technologies, operations, and capabilities that work together to accomplish the goals and objectives identified to address the problem space. • Third, there must be a Bridging Methodology which allows for the “back and forth” between the problem space and solution space; i.e., the tracking, integration, and tradeoffs among objectives, requirements and architectural solutions to the problem. • Finally, there must be a rigorous and repeatable portfolio decision methodology that allows for the values of the decision maker and his/her organization to be incorporated, and for defensible, tractable decisions to be made. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 4: Address the Problem | 39 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
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