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UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE for these systems relies on external cueing that radiation sources could be expected in the immediate vicinity of operations. The next generation of radiation detection systems for this application may include large‐array gamma and neutron detectors, passive neutron and gamma ray spectral imagers, and possibly active neutron and photon (bremsstrahlung) interrogation sources. If successfully developed and deployed––and the Task Force cautions that much work will be needed to do so––such active systems could extend the useable detection range out to ~100 meters depending on the quantities of SNM and associated shielding of the objects in question. Finding Loose Nukes or Identifying Theater Nuclear Weapons. These continue to be the most challenging problems for detection and identification of SNM sources. As noted elsewhere in this report, radiation detection by itself will play a limited part in the solution to these challenges. A networked search and discovery architecture that includes non‐radiation sensors along with near‐real‐time data and information fusion and dissemination will need to be developed. Radiation sensors would be engaged only during the end game when a likely location for a hidden weapon or SNM has been identified. At that point, radiation sensors would be used to identify and characterize the source before interdiction by personnel or destruction by kinetic munitions. Longer Range Detection. Active interrogation for stand‐off detection using high energy photons to stimulate fission has demonstrated detection of delayed neutrons. Interrogation distances up to 100m have been demonstrated, but detection distances have been limited to tens of meters. Long range (100m to kilometers) stand‐off radiation detection and identification of SNM must await future breakthroughs. There is little chance of a deployed technical solution in the next 10 years. 5.3.4. Agency Responsibilities and Inter‐Agency Coordination The agencies with principal responsibilities for technical development as well as operational deployment of radiation detection systems are the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security. The DoD must protect its bases and other sites, be prepared for detecting radiation sources in hostile environments, carry out on‐site inspections and (ideally) detect SNM from standoff distances (> 100 m). The DOE has a myriad of different programs that involve radiation detection including non‐proliferation, monitoring of material in the nuclear fuel cycle, operations at international borders and ports, and searches for suspected loose material or weapons. The DHS has the lead role in U.S.‐based operations including borders and ports and for activities in public U.S. environments. There is a four‐part MOU among those three agencies plus the DNI for coordination of nuclear detection R&D, and an interagency working group (IWG) led by the President’s OSTP. These mechanisms help provide substantial information exchange and communication among the workers in the field and has been successful in avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort, but the diversity of technical and operational needs makes it difficult to set (or infer) overall research and development priorities. Novel concepts and new materials are continually being proposed and should be evaluated DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 5: Improve the Tools: Access, Sense, Assess | 56 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE within each of the major government programs because it is possible that one may produce breakthroughs in cost and/or performance, but the Task Force found none that were sufficiently mature to warrant a major ramp‐up in investments. The major shortcomings across the federal efforts are two: (1) there is no integrated mechanism for setting R&D priorities across the programs or for allocating funding along such lines; and (2) operational requirements to measure the readiness of a given technology or operational system for transition to a specific application are often lacking, such that much of the radiation detection technology that is developed is never transferred to operational use. The task force believes that a more unified “national” technology roadmap can aid both the individual agencies and the efficiency of the overall federal programs. In addition, understanding the interplay between possible radiation detection capabilities and the broad range of possible (other) monitoring technologies, operations, and scenarios should be improved within both the R&D and operational communities. 5.3.5. Key Findings: Radiation Detection The task force did not try to down‐select or set research and development priorities among the various technologies since the wide range of applications often calls for differing solutions. Rather, it focused on identifying mechanisms that would enable the various agencies to do their work more effectively and also produce a better overall federal approach to radiation detection. Our specific findings are as follows: • Operational requirements to measure the practicality and readiness of a given technology or operational system for transition to a specific application are too often lacking. As a result, much of the radiation detection technology that is developed is never transferred to operational use. • Technology and concept of operations (CONOPs) are both workable problems for New START treaty verification. Intrusiveness and information protection must be addressed. • Beyond New Start, the requirement for monitoring will begin to emphasize individual warhead or bomb counting; solutions that simultaneously verify the presence of a warhead without revealing sensitive classified design information will be needed. • There are technically plausible approaches at ports and borders for detecting plutonium and radiological materials; shielded uranium requires continuing research. Several systems are currently in the pipeline for deployment during the next several years. All methods involve trades among CONOPs and cost‐benefit choices, which must be resolved before deployment. • Radiation detection will have a limited role in finding loose SNM or theater nuclear weapons; however, when a suspect object is found, radiation detectors should be able to identify and characterize it. • Managed access at national nuclear facilities and test ranges is needed for technical and operational development of radiation detectors. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 5: Improve the Tools: Access, Sense, Assess | 57 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
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