monitoring

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UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • Create “corridors of observation” in multiple domains (geographic, commercial, individuals, financial…) based on open source and available multi‐intelligence (INT) information; • Establish “patterns of life” within corridors that are suspicious; • Focus persistent monitoring assets on individuals and activities of greatest concern that emerge from patterns of life analyses; • Assemble and analyze data from all sources to support verification or identify previously unknown concerns; • Use results of analyses to iterate––i.e., to provide ever more focus for intelligence taskings, as well as provide guidance for needed improvements in technical and operational capabilities. National Security Staff (NSS) should request that DoD integrate the architectural elements into a global awareness system that: • Builds on lessons and experiences of successful national security capabilities, such as the Counter IED Operations Center (COIC), NSA’s counter‐terrorism capabilities, NCPC’s counterproliferation efforts, and on DOE’s Proliferation Risk Analysis Program; • Builds also upon the lessons and experience of the IC’s Treaty Monitoring Manager3, which at the height of arms control monitoring in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, proved to be an effective vehicle for coordinating the work of multiple organizations and collection activities; • Uses the Monitoring and Verification (M&V) National Testing Capability (described and recommended in Chapter 6) as the key operational assessment vehicle to test a range of scenarios. The IC should recast DOE/IN’s historic “nth country” analytical capabilities into an “nth group” effort, adapted to the wider range of actors and designs accompanying both vertical and horizontal proliferation. • The “nth group” program should serve as a community asset for helping to characterize proliferation pathways from available data and advancing technology, and posit pathways to guide collection priorities. Address the Problem “Whole”: Key Findings and Recommendations Principal Findings: Experienced professionals in M&V have declined in number, but those engaged still tend to address the problem as an extension of approaches used in past treaties 3 The responsibilities of the Treaty Monitoring Manger are discussed more fully in the context of proliferation monitoring in Chapter 5. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Executive Summary| 6 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE and agreements. As further agreements drive both the U.S. and other signatories to smaller numbers of weapons, the price for inaccuracies increases. The monitoring challenge is further complicated by the many dimensions of proliferation discussed above. A more robust approach is needed, one that is derived from common community characterization of the problem in its full breadth, depth, and extent; i.e., a systems approach. In addition, there is a need to re‐grow a knowledgeable workforce, especially systems analysts to support threat assessment, trade‐off analyses, and investment prioritization. Historic contributors such as the DOE national laboratories remain critical to addressing the nonproliferation problem. However, the Task Force believes that the responsible agencies would benefit from enlisting a wider array of performers (other labs, contractors, academia) to address the full complexity of this problem space that calls for new, as well as improved, tools. Recommendations: As the lead agencies, State/AVC, ASD(NCB), NNSA and NCPC should create the processes and oversee the following steps: • Establish a “White Team” whose charter is to characterize the comprehensive Monitoring and Verification Framework, relating threat events and actions to monitoring requirements, both cooperative and unilateral. o The White Team should be assigned to a “home” agency, but supported and governed by an interagency “board” whose members have sufficient authority to influence any needed changes in strategy and program directions at their home agencies. • Ensure a common understanding among agency leads for addressing all aspects of the framework, including policy, diplomacy, operations, and research, development, test & evaluation (RDT&E). o It is critical that those agencies involved in implementing M&V capabilities maintain a high degree of unanimity on how M&V problems and challenges are characterized, and how they will be addressed in order for the White Team to be both effective and sustainable. The adoption of common frameworks (such as that proposed in this report) can contribute to developing a common understanding of national strategy, goals, and pathways for accomplishing those goals. The foundation established with the two steps above leads to the following implementation steps, again under the charge of the leading agencies: • Adapt or create integrated implementation plans. No single agency has purview over the totality of the responsibilities in the M&V mission, but integration “across the seams” is required. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Executive Summary| 7 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
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