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UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE crossings and ports, and are the confirming step in any search for suspected hidden SNM or weapons. The detector technology of choice is dictated by several factors. Most importantly, the laws of physics and the limits of engineering art set bounds on what can be detected in various operational scenarios (see Figure 5‐2). Detection and identification are relatively straightforward when access to potential sources of SNM is relatively unconstrained by distance or time. However, this is usually not the case. More often the detector system, including data processing and display, needs to be portable, relatively low cost, and easily operated in stressing environments with limited access. In every important application there is a trade‐off that must be made among all of the possible characteristics that would be possessed by the ideal detector. Material Shielding Distance (m)* Distance (m)* Neutrons Gammas 12kg HEU 3cm Tungsten 0.2
UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE deployed during the coming decade. In all cases, these represent quantitative but evolutionary improvements in capability rather than revolutionary new techniques that overcome longstanding range limitations. Nonetheless they will greatly enhance the ability to monitor ports, border crossings, and vehicle cargoes for hidden SNM. What remains elusive is practical detection schemes at ranges greater than 100m and identification of illicit activities involving SNM. There are copious reports summarizing the state of the art and future research directions in radiation detection. 27,28,29 Instead of repeating and summarizing the extensive discussions found in those documents, the Task Force chose to summarize the status of radiation detection technology for the main applications of interest and refer the reader to those documents for much of the background technical information. Close‐in Monitoring of SNM. Applications include on‐site and IAEA‐type inspections where close‐in access is possible. In this case, there is a need for improved measurement systems for identification and quantification of SNM in a variety of material types and configurations. Examples of promising research areas include high‐resolution gamma‐ray spectrometers operating at room temperature; improved neutron coincidence counting and neutron multiplicity measurements; correlated measurements of fission gammas and neutrons; and advanced micro‐calorimetry. Hidden SNM at Ports, Borders, and in Vehicle Cargoes. As noted previously, a tremendous effort to develop radiation detection equipment for these applications has occurred since September 11. Passive gamma and neutron instrumentation has been deployed overseas (e.g., as part of DOE’s Megaports program). The Department of Homeland Security has deployed fixed‐site radiation detection and radiography equipment at U.S. ports and borders. Portable radiation search equipment has been shared with partners through the Proliferation Security Initiative. The next generation of radiation detection instruments with improved performance for these applications is in the pipeline of testing and qualification for deployment over the next several years. Operations in Contested Areas. A variety of passive gamma and neutron radiation detectors are now available for operations in denied areas, primarily for troop protection where the presence of radiation is anticipated. Portable radiation detection equipment for aircraft and ground vehicles has been demonstrated under battlefield conditions. The concept of operations For example: 27 NNSA, “Special Nuclear Materials Detection Program: Radiation Sensors and Sources Roadmap,” NA22‐OPD‐01‐ 2010 (recommended as one of the most comprehensive) 28 Congressional Research Service, “Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials:Science, Technologies, Obervations,” R40154, June 4, 2010 29 JASONS, “Concealed Nuclear Weapons,” JSR‐03‐130(2003); “Active Interrogation,” JSR‐09‐2‐2 (2009); “Lifetime Extension Program (LEP) Executive Summary,” JSR‐09‐334E (2009) DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 5: Improve the Tools: Access, Sense, Assess | 55 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
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