monitoring

UNCLASSIFIED
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
6.3. Monitoring Dual‐Capable Nuclear Forces, Including Warhead Counting for Arms Control
Treaties
Monitoring dual‐capable (nuclear and conventional) systems is of interest in its own right, but it
also epitomizes other monitoring problems. It illustrates the synergies among the four
elements of the Task Force’s basic 2x2 matrix of Figure 1‐2, which encompasses the full scope
of the monitoring regime; i.e., monitoring for the purpose of treaty‐compliance and monitoring
for threat assessment, within the context of both negotiated and/or cooperative monitoring
agreements and non‐negotiated/unilateral monitoring.
All nations that have nuclear weapons, except for the UK, have dual‐capable (DC) weapons, and
many of these nations, including recent proliferators, have only dual‐capable nuclear systems.
It is likely that most potential future proliferators (Iran, etc.) will use dual‐capable platforms for
their initial, if not longer term, nuclear capability.
There is a wide range of dual‐capable weapon‐system types:
• Air forces: gravity bombs, air‐launched cruise missiles, air‐to‐air missiles, defense
suppression missiles.
• Ground forces: anti‐armor infantry weapons, tube artillery, surface‐to‐surface missiles,
air defense missiles, demolition munitions; some are dual‐role (e.g., surface‐to‐air and
surface‐to‐surface).
• Naval forces: surface‐to‐surface missiles, air defense missiles, ASW weapons, torpedoes
• Special forces weapons
We have also seen that some nuclear warheads may be dual‐use (i.e., strategic and TNF),
adaptable both ways.
It is important to take into account that most proliferators will rely on “hiddenness” and
uncertainty in general, for their nuclear systems survivability. The survivability provided by
hiddenness and uncertainty tends to enhance crisis stability but exacerbates the difficulty of
monitoring and verification for both arms control and threat assessment. The net effect may
be that the risk of miscalculation by current or potential future adversaries increases, and
overall strategic stability over the long term decreases. How transparency, certainty and
uncertainty, and stability interact, for good or ill, is an important issue that deserves more
systematic thought than it has received to date. Dual capability is an integral part of this
question, because of the uncertainty about whether any given delivery platform may be armed
with, or destined to be armed with, a nuclear weapon.
To be effective, monitoring of dual‐capable forces must cover the full spectrum of activities:
design, production, storage, and deployment; during both peacetime and crisis/war operations;
for both nuclear warheads and DC systems. Understanding this complete set of activities––i.e.,
the “pattern of life” for dual capable systems––illuminates each individual part, including parts
DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 6: Experiment to Iterate and Adapt: National Testing Capability | 70
Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies
UNCLASSIFIED