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UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE decomposition map, and then captured as part of the overall solution architecture assessment. Areas of disagreement in assessments, or those areas that are not well covered (or overcovered) by current analytical results can be readily identified. In this way, a decomposition map can also serve to guide the overall effort of an M&V analytical capability, such as that described in Section A.6. Each node in the scenario framework proposed in Section A.2 will have at least one unique decomposition map associated with it in a fully formed analytical effort. There are only a limited number of unique investible assets that may be incorporated in prospective solution architectures, and many assets are likely applicable to several different functional objectives and tasks. These observations imply that most assets will aggregate requirements from multiple scenario nodes, strategic capability areas, functional objectives, and tasks. Assets must be assessed against each set, and synergies may be identified and leveraged when designing solution architectures. Optimistically, the same asset may have sufficient performance and applicability across multiple tasks, functional objectives, strategic capability areas, and scenario nodes. This implies that if a consistent accounting of performance and benefits is made, through a systematic methodology as proposed here, then benefits across the problem space can be better understood, and investments in one area may have the effect of reducing risk in areas outside the scenario node currently being investigated. In this way, one might imagine a fully executed analytical model of the M&V mission areas as a large multi‐layered network – on one face exists the problem description (i.e. the scenario framework), and on the opposite face proposed solution architectures in the form of a set of investible assets. The layers in between are highly connected and consist of the layers articulated in the description of the bridging methodology described above. A.6. Decomposition Map Example The overall decomposition approach described in Section A.5 may be best described through the example illustrated in Figure A‐3. The example decomposition map begins with a focus on the scenario node “Non‐State Attempt to Move Weapon”. The scenario node is decomposed into more specific scenario sub‐nodes; in this case the analyst is concerned with “In Country Movement” of a nuclear weapon or asset. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Appendix A: Unabridged Description | 86 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Figure A‐3 Example Decomposition Map The next step of decomposition moves from the problem description (the red shaded area in the decomposition map) towards the articulation of a solution architecture (the blue shaded area in the decomposition map). The scenario sub‐nodes are decomposed into strategic capability areas dividing the problem space into discrete mission areas – in this case border <strong>monitoring</strong> is highlighted. In addition to other functional objectives, it may be desirable as part of border <strong>monitoring</strong> to control a perimeter around an area of interest, preventing nuclear materials or devices of interest from moving across that perimeter (it may also be desirable to allow innocent traffic to cross the perimeter, as in border control scenarios). Additionally, the capability to search small areas thoroughly, and search large areas efficiently may be important functional objectives. The functional objective, “Perimeter Control” can be further decomposed into a set of tasks that must be accomplished in order fulfill that objective. These tasks and the assets associated with them represent a proposed solution architecture for accomplishing the objectives specified. For example, the perimeter must be established and maintained. Additionally, items that pass through that perimeter must be inspected to ensure that no nuclear contraband is DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Appendix A: Unabridged Description | 87 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
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