monitoring

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DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
information access and widespread observational tools are increasing inherent transparency.
At the same time, recognition of such increased transparency by potential or actual proliferants
naturally leads to more sophisticated methods of denial and deception.
The actual or threatened acquisition of nuclear weapons by more actors, for a range of
different reasons, is emerging in numbers not seen since the first two decades of the Cold War.
Many of these actors are hostile to the U.S. and its allies, and they do not appear to be bound
by established norms nor deterred by traditional means. In some cases of established nuclear
powers, nuclear forces are seen as the most affordable and effective alternative to deter
superior conventional forces; i.e., nuclear weapons are viewed as a legitimate warfighting
capability, especially if their vital domestic or regional security interests are threatened. For
example, Russia has publicly stated in doctrine and backed it up with training and exercises that
they will use theater nuclear forces if necessary to deter aggression against the
homeland. 5,6,7,8,9
The pathways to proliferation are expanding. Networks of cooperation among countries that
would otherwise have little reason to do so, such as the A.Q. Khan network or the Syria‐North
Korea and Iran‐North Korea collaborations, cannot be considered as isolated events. Moreover,
the growth in nuclear power worldwide offers more opportunity for “leakage” and/or hiding
small programs, especially since current resources to support safeguards are already strained
and will be increasingly challenged by cases of noncompliance.
In short, for the first time since the early decades of the nuclear era, the nation needs to be
equally concerned about both “vertical” proliferation (the increase in capabilities of existing
nuclear states) and “horizontal” proliferation (an increase in the number of states and nonstate
actors possessing or attempting to possess nuclear weapons).
The challenges for monitoring in this context are much more difficult. Historically, and even
with New START, monitoring has focused on relatively few nations (only two in treaties
with Russia) and locations. Moreover, the objects to be monitored have been numerous and
easily identifiable (e.g., delivery platforms such as bombers, missiles, and submarines), the
facilities supporting the enterprise visible and often declared, and nuclear materials inventories
voluntarily declared.
5 Nikolai Sokov, Russia’s New National Security Concept: The Nuclear Angle, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Report, January 2000.
6 Statement by Sergey Ivanov, available at http://www.mil.ru/articles/article3667.shtml
7 Vladimir Putin, “Zakluychitelnoe Slovo na Soveshchanii s Rukovodyashim Sostovom Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossii”,
October 2, 2003 (available at htpp://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2003/10/53277.shtml).
8 Yuriy Golotuyk, “I v Vozdukhe Tozhe Problemy” Vremya novostey, February 19, 2001.
9 “Strategicheskaya Komandno‐Shtabnaya Treniroivka VS Rossii”, Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 17, 2001.
DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 1: The Problem | 13
Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies
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