monitoring

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UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE In the nuclear future as seen by the Task Force, monitoring will need to address more widespread foreign nuclear weapons related activities in a “messy” combination of negotiated, non‐cooperative, and non‐permissive environments. Any or all of the following could be factors in monitoring a particular nation or group of concern: • Small inventories of weapons and materials, even as low as a single “significant quantity of fissile material;” • Small nuclear enterprises designed to produce, store, and deploy only a small number of weapons – either as an end goal, or as the first steps of a proliferant, or a nuclear terrorist operation; • Undeclared facilities and/or covert operations such as testing below detection thresholds; • Use of non‐traditional technologies, presenting at best ambiguous signatures, to acquire both materials and components; • Theater nuclear forces and associated doctrine, exercises, and training complicated by the use of mobile, dual use delivery systems; • Many more players to whom access by the U.S. or its allies will be limited or extremely difficult, some of whom will be globally networked with global access to relevant science and technology. The stress on monitoring technologies is significant. Identifying and maintaining track on people, nuclear components and warheads now becomes a requirement, and in many cases, physical access will be limited. Moreover, the broad access to technology and the growing sophistication of cyber offenses by “them” as well as us will allow others to gain insights into our collection capabilities and methods. The challenges are further compounded by the many DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 1: The Problem | 14 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE dimensions of the nuclear enterprise that need to be monitored, as illustrated in Figure 1‐1. Figure 1‐1 Challenges are Further Compounded by What Needs to be Monitored The materials themselves in their many chemical forms, the operational configurations to which the materials are applied and associated facilities and infrastructure are all part of the enterprise that should be monitored. Nuclear energy operations, as well as nuclear weapons DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 1: The Problem | 15 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
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