monitoring

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DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Chapter 7. Summary and Conclusions
The Task Force’s mandate was broad, as specified in the Terms of Reference. As such, many
topics did not receive the in‐depth look that would help executing organizations with more
explicit recommendations on priorities and get started actions. For example, the Task Force fell
short in providing explicit recommendations for:
• Defining specific steps for the long term cooperative engagement plan;
• Assessing more thoroughly the opportunities and “dry holes” in applying conventional
warfighting ISR capabilities;
• Assessing the current and desired information flows and integration for early detection
of proliferation;
• Recommending in greater detail improvements in collection and analysis carried out by
the IC as part of the overall monitoring plan;
• Advancing materials monitoring and safeguarding technologies;
• Creating and sustaining the “White Team”;
• Developing a national RDT&E program for improving and fielding radiation detection
systems;
• Defining the specific requirements and implementation path beyond the initial step
recommended in the report for a national testing capability.
That said, the Task Force believes the comprehensive look it provided is both needed and
timely. The topic has not been previously addressed in anticipation of the nuclear monitoring
and verification demands that the nation is likely to face in the future. While difficult to predict,
that future seems poised to present challenges unlike any faced with the experience base
derived from historic nonproliferation and arms control treaty regimes. This is due to a number
of reasons highlighted throughout the report, but what to do about it forced the Task Force to
ask whether simply doing better at what we already know how to do would be sufficient. The
answer the Task Force came to was “no”. Instead a combination of evolution and innovation is
called for.
In that context, the Task Force admonishes leadership not to repeat shortcomings of the past
where monitoring technology and verification efforts were tied to the treaty or the
proliferation problem immediately at hand, and then declined when that problem had been
addressed or had diminished in perceived importance. The problem of managing the global
nuclear environment for stability will be with us for a very long time. The best bet for making
progress is a sustained effort in which experienced and competent professionals can devote
their careers to the quest and pass on their wisdom to successive generations.
Success in this long and important effort is not guaranteed, considering the difficulty of the
future monitoring challenges. But progress can be made, building on successes of the
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Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies
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