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UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE detect anomalous behaviors or activities, and flexibility to rapidly reassign monitoring assets to “pop‐up” areas of interest. The Task Force believes there is promise in applying the conventional ISR paradigm to the proliferation monitoring problem. Unknown, however, is how well the ISR paradigm can be adapted to the spatial and temporal domains for monitoring suspect nuclear activities where long periods of observing normal patterns of life over large geographic areas will be punctuated by short duration anomalous events. Nonetheless, the impressive advances made in Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in support of locating both IEDs and the perpetrators warrant a serious effort to see how well these ISR technical and architectural approaches can be adapted to support proliferation monitoring. 3.3. A Cursory Examination of ISR Applied to Nuclear Monitoring A closer examination of undesirable nuclear activities reveals two categories of focus for monitoring activities. Whether state or non‐state actors, the two “headline” activities of concern are: 1) obtaining a nuclear device from existing stockpiles, or SNM from existing storage facilities; or 2) developing a nuclear device. In both of these cases, the primary objective should be to transition the initial monitoring problem (overwhelmingly large area and very small observable signature) into a more tractable one by either reducing the area that needs to be monitored or by establishing a more observable indicator of the activity. The Task Force then dissected the problem into its simplest parts. The ways that a nuclear device could be obtained from an existing nuclear arsenal include: • Buying: A large amount of money might induce the release of a few; • Stealing: An insider could sneak one out of a facility; • Be given one: Leaders of a weapon state could give one to a sympathetic or surrogate organization; • Recovering: A lost device might be found; • Capturing: A device may be taken from a storage facility or during transit. The development of a nuclear device is in a relative sense conceptually simpler in that the developer must obtain or process SNM. Plutonium is more easily obtained, but weaponization more difficult. By contrast, HEU is more difficult to produce, but a device is relatively easy to fabricate. With this simplified view of undesirable nuclear activities to be detected as early as possible, monitoring objectives can be stated as follows: DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 3: Unilateral Measures | 34 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • Maintain an accurate accounting of existing nuclear material and devices in both declared and non‐declared countries (see Chapter 2 for a phased path to achieve this objective); • Detect and follow progress of suspected nuclear device development activity. The Task Force then asked what the ASW and IED problems might teach us about this problem. The principal lesson is that detection using any single phenomenology or based on a single observable is not going to be successful. A multi‐modal approach that goes after both primary and secondary observables is required. Much of what was learned from the IED problem can be summarized as “find the network, find the device.” Groups, not individual actors, carry out nuclear activities, much like the development and deployment of an IED. Coordination among several actors and organizations is required either to obtain a device or to develop one. Observing this coordination is the first indicator in the monitoring process and one for which many of the tools developed in dealing with IEDs should be well suited. Exploiting the cyber domain should certainly be a big part of any nuclear monitoring effort. Both passive, depending on what is sent voluntarily, and active sources should be considered. Data gathered from the cyber domain establishes a rich and exploitable source for determining activities of individuals, groups and organizations needed to participate in either the procurement or development of a nuclear device. In fact, a set of new techniques, e.g. Advanced Graph Analysis (i.e., modeling relationships between data elements and data attributes as graphs to solve complex analytical problems), for exploiting these data have been developed and can be applied to the network of people possibly engaged in the activities associated with nuclear weapons. Exploitation of the cyber domain to follow people, financial transactions, etc., is a critical first step in establishing a focus for technical monitoring based on other phenomenologies. 23 In other words, given the cyber cues, concentrated multi‐INT collection and exploitation over a focused area is feasible. This is the basic process that has been used with success in recent areas of conflict where air and space collection platforms have generally enjoyed unfettered access. Moving forward, these same processes need to be applied in denied areas. Many of the new technology advances in data exfiltration, covert implantation, etc., hold promise for successful multi‐INT collection and exploitation in non‐permissive environments. 23 The potential for OSINT (open source intelligence) as a focusing step is also promising and should be explored. See Chapter 5, Section 5.5.4 for a discussion. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 3: Unilateral Measures | 35 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
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