monitoring

UNCLASSIFIED
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The third integral part of the testing capability would be a standing analytical “White Team”
that would use the scenario‐generator and scenario‐to‐asset planning approach (see Chapter 4)
to guide exercises/experiments, assess implications of testing and training results, and identify
needed changes/improvements for the next cycle. It would provide a simulation capability and
translate test results to deployed monitoring operations. The information management aspects
of the White Team activities would eventually become part of the real world ops center for the
comprehensive nuclear monitoring system of systems.
The fourth essential element of the testing capability would be a standing Red Teaming activity.
Red teaming would include active R&D on means by which adversaries could (or do) evade
threat‐assessment monitoring and by which treaty partners might evade treaties and treatymonitoring,
including by deception and denial. A key step would be to rebuild a national
nuclear threat assessment capability, principally but not exclusively with the National Labs, that
anticipates “nth group” weapon designs, development, and production approaches (as
discussed in Chapter 3). The services and certain combatant commands (COCOMs) could
explore ways in which nth‐countries might deploy, operate, and employ nuclear and dualcapable
weapon systems and forces. The White Team would referee red‐teaming, for example
by specifying the levels of technology, or degree of knowledge of U.S. systems, that might be
attributed to various actual or simulated adversaries.
6.2.3. What Would Be Done Using the Testing Capability?
The testing capability would eventually cover the full range of experiment, test, demonstrate,
exercise, and train, through multiple cycles of learn‐iterate‐adapt. The testing capability could
be used to explore very specific detailed topics, like improved CONOPS for a particular type of
advanced sensor, and very general questions, like the interplay between transparency and
stability. Each experiment would use a few or many of the types of facilities and capabilities
that are part of the testing capability. The exercises, tests, etc., would explore the full scope of
current and possible future monitoring applications: nonproliferation, counter‐proliferation,
countering nuclear terrorism, IAEA monitoring applications, Comprehensive Nuclear‐Test‐Ban
Treaty (CTBT) monitoring, cooperative threat reduction, routine and challenge on‐site
inspections, negotiated over‐flights (Open Skies done right – see Chapter 2), and confidencebuilding
measures.
The exercises and experiments would be sponsored by all relevant USG agencies, occasionally
singly but more often jointly. In certain important cases there would be international
participation, partly for confidence‐building purposes or ideally, as an integral part of the
phased strategy for cooperative regimes discussed in Chapter 2. There would be red‐ and blueteaming,
in multiple forms.
DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 6: Experiment to Iterate and Adapt: National Testing Capability | 68
Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies
UNCLASSIFIED