monitoring

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DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
of nuclear weapons, it has had, at best, a mixed record of success in sustaining national efforts.
This situation should be addressed with the highest priority, and the Task Force provides in this
chapter one approach for how to do so.
2.2. A Well Established Starting Point: The Nonproliferation Treaty and Its Limitations
A baseline of nuclear transparency has been established with the Treaty on the Non‐
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 13 However, the NPT regime remains under significant
pressure—both from the expansion of nuclear power with the associated monitoring demands,
and the continued intransigence of states violating their safeguard obligations.
In order to diversify their energy portfolios and meet growing demands for electricity, new
states are venturing into civilian nuclear power. Most, if not all, of this expansion will be
benign, but the dual‐use nature of nuclear technology, at least with regard to SNM production,
raises a number of concerns. Some of this growth will occur in areas of instability and/or
regional tension. The recent events of the “Arab Spring” illustrate the potential for political
volatility and range of possible outcomes.
Sensitive nuclear technologies, particularly those used in enrichment and reprocessing facilities,
present unique monitoring and verification challenges. There are inherent difficulties
monitoring complex, industrial size bulk handling facilities and processes. Expansion of nuclear
power risks the illicit spread of these capabilities. The Kahn network illustrated the difficulties
of controlling key technologies in a globalized and increasingly sophisticated manufacturing
base. Collusion amongst proliferators enables states to bypass technological hurdles, serving to
further complicate nonproliferation efforts.
In spite of these complexities, it is still decidedly easier to monitor declared material and
facilities as the NPT (further enabled more recently by the Additional Protocol) has enabled for
40+ years, so that expanding the fraction of nuclear activities under “routine” inspection is
desirable. Cooperative monitoring regimes provide a baseline of information while defining
legitimate nuclear behavior. In recent years, linking nuclear security with Safeguards is
providing a basis for engagement and cooperation between states to promote high standards
for material protection, control and accounting. Cooperative monitoring also allows focusing of
13 The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and
weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of
achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding
commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear‐weapon States. Opened for
signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A
total of 190 parties have joined the Treaty, including the five declared (at that time) nuclear‐weapon States. More
countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the
Treaty's significance. (Ref.: http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml)
DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 2: Cooperative Regimes| 21
Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat
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