01.12.2014 Views

monitoring

monitoring

monitoring

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

UNCLASSIFIED<br />

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE<br />

o Agree on investment strategies. There should be supporting inter‐agency<br />

roadmaps to integrate efforts and focus crosstalk. Annual inter‐agency reports<br />

to the NSS should be issued to track progress and enhance information flow. 4<br />

• DOE/NNSA, DTRA, and the IC should rebalance existing investments in order to grow<br />

new programs in R&D that expand activities and the supplier base to include adaptation<br />

of conventional warfighting ISR advances: e.g.,<br />

o Engage in planning and capabilities development, especially for data collection<br />

and fusion functions, for DoD’s efforts to improve nuclear situational awareness;<br />

o Support transition of multi‐INT fusion and exploitation tools to nuclear<br />

<strong>monitoring</strong> applications;<br />

o Ensure activities related to nuclear weapons and materials <strong>monitoring</strong> are<br />

guided by the “white team” function as discussed in the previous section and<br />

Chapter 4;<br />

o Make explicit the requirements for, and improvements needed in, HUMINT,<br />

SIGINT, cyber, OSINT, etc., to support <strong>monitoring</strong> and verification.<br />

• NSS should monitor closely and persistently the resourcing to modernize the USAEDS<br />

with the help of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), who should<br />

ensure its modernization, is supported in AF budgets.<br />

Test to Iterate and Adapt: Key Findings and Recommendations<br />

Findings: The comprehensive <strong>monitoring</strong> regime the Task Force proposes is a system of systems<br />

that must work together. It is too complicated to plan or assess analytically or with piecemeal<br />

testing, especially when used against an adaptive adversary and/or one with sophisticated<br />

denial and deception. Furthermore, experience shows that operators typically learn to use<br />

fielded systems differently and often better than system design/analysis would predict––an<br />

effect that would result from into iterative development and training.<br />

Recommendations: DTRA, in partnership with DOE/NNSA and the IC, should develop<br />

comprehensive “iterate and adapt” national testing capabilities which:<br />

• Provide a focal point for planning, iterating/adapting, and operating the system<br />

of systems;<br />

• Help integrate technically disparate and organizationally disaggregated activities.<br />

The national testing capabilities should include four interdependent parts:<br />

• Ranges and facilities (real and simulated), almost all of which currently exist;<br />

4 An excellent recent example of this is the “Nuclear Defense Research and Development Roadmap. Fiscal Years<br />

2013‐2017” published by the National Science and Technology Council, April 2012.<br />

DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Executive Summary| 10<br />

Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies<br />

UNCLASSIFIED

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!