monitoring

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DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The Task Force recommends a 4‐phase approach for expanded cooperation, each step of which
would gradually evolve to “internationalize the transparency inspections.” The Task Force
approach could be enabled by expansion of the role of IAEA for assuming responsibility for the
transparency responsibilities that ultimately emerge:
1. Bilateral, cooperative developments and evaluations among P‐5 states, building on
experience in historic allied partnership programs, as well as the CTR program with
Russia;
2. Extension to all nuclear weapon states;
3. Expansion to nuclear materials transparency among major states with nuclear power
generation;
4. Negotiation of a future Non‐Proliferation Treaty (NPT “X”) to bring in all nuclear weapon
and material programs into a cooperative, multi‐lateral regime.
The three lead offices cited should establish a Multi‐Agency Roadmap in partnership with other
relevant players in the USG. The effort should be spearheaded by a (U.S.) Mission Manager 20 to
drive the realization and coordination for this initiative throughout the development process.
Key steps in support of the engagement plan and roadmap include the following:
• The activities outlined in the Road Map should be given priority within the participating
Agencies, including clear definition of the anticipated step‐by‐step approach to realize
the initiative.
• The State Department should begin to consult with foreign representatives, in order to
prepare for their participation, starting with a rough schedule for joint efforts, and
devise measures of effectiveness to ensure success through the distinct phases (P‐5,
nuclear weapon states, SNM possessors, etc.)
• Blue Team and Red Team efforts 21 should begin and be coordinated from the outset, to
ensure that the proposals brought forward can meet the requirements to protect our
own (and others) sensitive information from being revealed, while meeting the goals of
accurate SNM characterizations.
• Major efforts should be mounted to adapt the proposed technologies into use, in the
U.S. and in countries worldwide, to ensure that security measures are not compromised
for either warheads or materials. (This will entail creativity and flexibility by both the
inspected and inspecting parties to ensure that robust security information protection
and material protection measures are retained.)
• Focused consultations with the U.S. Congress will be needed to ensure that all foreign
interactions and participations meet U.S. Atomic Energy Act protections and
20 See Chapter 5 for a more complete discussion on the Mission Manager role.
21 See Chapters 4 and 6 for a more complete discussion on the Blue and Red teaming.
DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 2: Cooperative Regimes| 30
Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat
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