monitoring

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DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
In its first phase during WWII, the ASW problem was significantly diminished by the advanced
code breaking devices developed (the precursors of modern day computers), along with careful
analysis of the patterns of operation by the German fleet. The second ASW problem, tracking
the extremely quiet nuclear propelled and armed submarine developed during the Cold War,
was addressed by the judicious blending of advanced large scale sonar arrays, discrete
shadowing of threatening boats, and advanced algorithms to pull small signals from high clutter
environments.
The IED problem has been addressed with a twofold attack: find the network and find the
device. This has resulted in a significant mitigation of the threat. Both existing and new
technologies have been brought to bear to address this problem. They can be categorized and
characterized in the following six categories:
• Persistence: Holding the adversary at risk 24/7
• Multi‐INT integration: One or more INTs to “find”, one or more to “fix”
• Advanced network analyses: Tools to derive information from huge data sets
• New cyber tools and techniques: Cyber mining and geolocating to latitude and
longitude
• Improved SIGINT: More signals, under more conditions
3.2. Characteristics of Monitoring Illicit Nuclear Activities
The Task Force agreed that the guiding principle for monitoring to detect undesirable nuclear
activity should be detection of activities as early in the planning and acquisition of a capability
as possible in order to provide the greatest number of options for slowing or reversing the
effort. Difficulties arise from several factors––each one a challenge in itself, but in
combination, as or more daunting than the ASW or Counter‐IED problems. First, the number of
actors and their geographic dispersion worldwide is large. Second, the observables are limited,
typically ambiguous, and part of a high clutter environment of unrelated activities. Moreover,
at low levels associated with small or nascent programs, key observables are easily masked and
observation made more difficult without ready access by the full range of persistent
intelligence systems. Third, and perhaps most significant, is that radiation phenomenology
unique to SNM is not detectable at long standoff distances, further exacerbating the large area
problem.
The signal‐to‐clutter characteristics are similar to those faced in ISR support to conventional
warfighting and counterterrorism. The ISR architectural approach is based on a cueing principle
that starts with general observations from multiple intelligence and surveillance sources and
assigns ever more specific and precise assets to targets that appear to be of growing concern.
Distinguishing characteristics of this approach are persistence, but not necessarily of the
highest fidelity, widespread access to all the available data, allowing more “eyes on target” to
DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 3: Unilateral Measures | 33
Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies
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