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UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE<br />
Figure 4‐1 Elements of an M&V Analytical Methodology<br />
A common issue in the development of analytical frameworks has been the tendency to frame<br />
the problem and solution together. The conflation of “problem space” and “solution space”<br />
brings with it several consequences:<br />
• It tends to promote metrics and assessments that support optimized subsystem or<br />
component performance vs. system performance by assuming they are one and the<br />
same.<br />
• It tends to lead analysts to fixate on a narrower problem (such as detector performance)<br />
rather than assessing those issues in the context of the larger whole.<br />
• It does not enable a common understanding of the problem space itself, allowing<br />
solutions to be framed in whatever manner the solution proponent deems suitable.<br />
All of these symptoms run counter to enabling the decision maker to achieve his/her ultimate<br />
goal: rendering and defending a provably effective investment strategy for M&V capability<br />
development. Separating the “problem space” from the “solution space” and analyzing them<br />
independently can therefore yield benefits by eliminating or mitigating these issues.<br />
To illustrate the point, consider that detection systems have often been placed at the forefront of<br />
the national strategy for detecting the illicit movement of nuclear threats in proliferation<br />
regimes. While undoubtedly detectors play a role in the solution, the bulk of current analytical<br />
activities are focused on detector system performance. As a result, the M&V problem of<br />
detecting illicit movements is often miscast implicitly as a detector problem. This can lead to<br />
the line of thinking that more detectors with better detector performance parameters must<br />
logically provide reduced risk – a statement that may or may not be true. More importantly,<br />
other options that do not hinge on detector deployments may in fact provide more cost<br />
effective mechanisms for risk reductions.<br />
DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 4: Address the Problem | 40<br />
Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies<br />
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