monitoring

UNCLASSIFIED
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
• Develop and apply quality assurance methods for crowd sourcing of
commercial imagery results;
o Ensure that DoD’s activities for improving global indications and warning
leverage existing sources of information and capabilities, and develop the
analytics to produce actionable nuclear‐related threat warnings;
o Adapt the Treaty Monitoring Manager’s role to one of a Proliferation Monitoring
Manager, “home based” in NCPC, with orchestration and integration
responsibilities to assess both horizontal and vertical proliferation.
• DOE/NNSA, DHS/DNDO, DoD/DTRA and the IC should build upon the existing MOU to
improve coordination and execution of their respective radiation detection programs to:
o Conduct systems studies and engage operators early in development to improve
transition of radiation detection advances to the field;
o Ensure that developers and users agree in advance on system concepts,
measures of success and levels of readiness for the principal technologies and
operational scenarios of interest;
o Focus new efforts on accelerating development of research with near‐term
payoffs, and investment in longer range technologies that can meet both
technical and operational feasibility requirements;
o Develop managed access to nuclear facilities and test ranges by all involved
agencies at which detection technologies and operational approaches can be
explored using real SNM;
o Agree on investment strategies. There should be supporting inter‐agency
roadmaps to integrate efforts and focus crosstalk. Annual inter‐agency reports
to the NSS should be issued to track progress and enhance information flow. 36
• DOE/NNSA, DTRA, and the IC should rebalance existing investments to grow new
programs in R&D that expand activities and the supplier base to include adaptation of
conventional warfighting ISR advances: e.g.,
o Engage in planning and capabilities development, especially for data collection
and fusion functions, for DoD’s efforts to improve nuclear situational awareness;
o Support transition of multi‐INT fusion and exploitation tools to nuclear
monitoring applications;
o Ensure activities related to nuclear weapons and materials monitoring are
guided by the “White Team” function as discussed in the previous section and
Chapter 4;
o Make explicit the requirements for, and improvements needed in, HUMINT,
SIGINT, cyber, OSINT, etc., to support monitoring and verification.
• NSS should monitor closely and persistently the resourcing to modernize the USAEDS
with the help of the VCJCS‐, who should ensure its modernization is supported in AF
budgets.
36 An excellent recent example of this is the “Nuclear Defense Research and Development Roadmap. Fiscal Years
2013‐2017,” National Science and Technology Council, April 2012.
DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 5: Improve the Tools: Access, Sense, Assess | 64
Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies
UNCLASSIFIED