monitoring

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UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Authentication is essential to the process if trust is to be achieved. However, it has been best understood in a data transmission context, and is less well developed for a cooperative monitoring context. Approaches to functional testing, joint development, and random selection along with advanced measurement techniques should all be explored. A clear understanding of the measurement protocol to be utilized, along with the development of appropriately tailored hardware/software, is needed to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities. • Persistent Surveillance and Perimeter Monitoring. Measures to provide enhanced and persistent surveillance within facilities, to monitor movements in and out of facilities, and on a limited regional basis will be needed in both arms control and international safeguards applications. Whether declared items and materials are of weapons origin, or derive from civilian activities, the ability to remotely monitor and understand nuclear activities in near‐real time is needed. Maintaining continuity of knowledge can deter violations and provide a basis for more efficient verification. New methods for monitoring facility perimeters and penetrations are needed to verify facility designs and monitor relevant material movements. Transfers from facility to facility over a wide but known area must also be tracked. These capabilities can be applied on a routine basis or as part of enhanced monitoring requirements authorized under U.N. Security Council resolutions in response to cases of noncompliance, e.g., the gas centrifuge facility at Natanz. Such monitoring approaches could benefit from recent lessons learned in developing ISR technical and architectural solutions to support conventional warfighting. 19 • Real‐time Process Monitoring. Within a facility, efforts to improve material assay capabilities should be augmented by on‐line instrumentation and process monitoring to provide the detailed information necessary to understand complex facility operations at enrichment and reprocessing plants. The large quantities of data generated through such approaches must be analyzed to draw relevant conclusions in a timely manner. This requires effective algorithms that correctly identify activities of concern without hampering legitimate activities. • In‐Field Inspection Tools. While accurate material measurements will remain important, IAEA is increasingly focused on investigations of noncompliance and assessing the nature of a state’s overall nuclear program. Since the Persian Gulf War and the revelations of the extent of the Iraqi nuclear program, the IAEA has shifted its attention to an examination of a state’s actions as a whole. This has led to an increased need for investigatory tools that can be used for in‐field measurements during an inspection, perhaps at previously undeclared locations. Providing as much information as possible to an inspector on past nuclear activities at a site, preferably while they still remain in the field, will grow in importance. Such forensic capability is also valuable in 19 See Chapters 3 and 5 for further discussion on this topic. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 2: Cooperative Regimes| 28 Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE verifying cases of nuclear roll‐back (e.g., Libya) and potentially the verification of dismantling or decommissioning in an arms control context. To assist investigation efforts in cases of suspected noncompliance, new tools are needed to support inspections in the field. Portable analytical capabilities that are capable of providing rapid and accurate sample analyses to inspectors should be further developed. Improved capabilities in this area help ensure that follow‐up activities can be swiftly identified, limiting opportunities for concealment attempts. 2.6. Considerations for U.S. Nuclear Modernization Programs As future arms control efforts will likely result in expanded access at U.S. facilities, weapons, and platforms, approaches for meeting verification objectives while limiting overall intrusiveness will be needed. An informal survey by the Task Force indicated that DOE/NNSA is aware of the concern and has introduced the issue into the programs for the new production facilities it is building. For example, a team from DOE’s nonproliferation program and from the State Department had a favorable review with the designers of the new Uranium Processing Facility in the weapons program. The Task Force did not learn of any comparable considerations integral to DoD’s programs. 2.7. Open Skies Treaty – Another Opportunity to Build Upon? The Task Force also considered the merits of extant treaties against the future proliferation environment and found them in need of updating to apply them to a broader proliferation agenda before significant investments are made. An example that was considered in detail was the upgrading of the capabilities of the United States Open Skies Treaty aircraft. Based on the quality of the sensors allowed by the treaty, the Task Force would not recommend such a course of action at this time. The sensor specifications permitted by the treaty are outdated when compared with the need. In fact, the existing treaty requirements can be fulfilled by sensor information readily available from commercial imagery without the expense of flight missions or sensor upgrades. Therefore the costs of such an upgrade of the aircraft, which would be significant, are not justified at this time. The Task Force believes, however, that the original principles of the treaty remain valuable and could serve as a template for expansion to other bilateral agreements, but the compliance protocols should be updated before any new aircraft upgrades are considered––in spite of the fact that the Russians are upgrading their system. 2.8. Recommendations: Cooperative Regimes International Cooperation and Transparency. State/AVC (diplomatic), DOE/NNSA/NA‐20 (technical), and DoD/DTRA (operational) should develop a joint long‐term international engagement plan aimed at the ultimate goal of international cooperation and transparency, and cooperatively implement their respective/shared responsibilities. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 2: Cooperative Regimes| 29 Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat UNCLASSIFIED
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