monitoring

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UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE o Agree on investment strategies. There should be supporting inter‐agency roadmaps to integrate efforts and focus crosstalk. Annual inter‐agency reports to the NSS should be issued to track progress and enhance information flow. 4 • DOE/NNSA, DTRA, and the IC should rebalance existing investments in order to grow new programs in R&D that expand activities and the supplier base to include adaptation of conventional warfighting ISR advances: e.g., o Engage in planning and capabilities development, especially for data collection and fusion functions, for DoD’s efforts to improve nuclear situational awareness; o Support transition of multi‐INT fusion and exploitation tools to nuclear monitoring applications; o Ensure activities related to nuclear weapons and materials monitoring are guided by the “white team” function as discussed in the previous section and Chapter 4; o Make explicit the requirements for, and improvements needed in, HUMINT, SIGINT, cyber, OSINT, etc., to support monitoring and verification. • NSS should monitor closely and persistently the resourcing to modernize the USAEDS with the help of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), who should ensure its modernization, is supported in AF budgets. Test to Iterate and Adapt: Key Findings and Recommendations Findings: The comprehensive monitoring regime the Task Force proposes is a system of systems that must work together. It is too complicated to plan or assess analytically or with piecemeal testing, especially when used against an adaptive adversary and/or one with sophisticated denial and deception. Furthermore, experience shows that operators typically learn to use fielded systems differently and often better than system design/analysis would predict––an effect that would result from into iterative development and training. Recommendations: DTRA, in partnership with DOE/NNSA and the IC, should develop comprehensive “iterate and adapt” national testing capabilities which: • Provide a focal point for planning, iterating/adapting, and operating the system of systems; • Help integrate technically disparate and organizationally disaggregated activities. The national testing capabilities should include four interdependent parts: • Ranges and facilities (real and simulated), almost all of which currently exist; 4 An excellent recent example of this is the “Nuclear Defense Research and Development Roadmap. Fiscal Years 2013‐2017” published by the National Science and Technology Council, April 2012. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Executive Summary| 10 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • Information/data management systems (e.g. data flows from and to sensors, information flows within analysis/fusion systems, and command/control data/information flows); • A standing/ongoing Red Teaming activity; • A White Team––a strong analytical component to assess the implications of test results and feedback into the cycle needed changes/improvements. Support from the IC (principally NCPC and DOE) should be provided for the purpose of rebuilding a national nuclear threat technical assessment capability that anticipates “nth group” designs, effects, employment and deployment approaches and observables (per one of the recommendations for “Unilateral Measures”). Summary The problem of managing the global nuclear environment to maintain stability will be with us for a very long time. The best bet for making progress is a sustained effort in which experience, competence, and relationships can be built over successive careers. The challenges are daunting and success will be difficult to come by, but prior experience tells us that persistence can lead to the outcomes we seek. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Executive Summary| 11 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
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