monitoring

UNCLASSIFIED
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
deployed during the coming decade. In all cases, these represent quantitative but evolutionary
improvements in capability rather than revolutionary new techniques that overcome
longstanding range limitations. Nonetheless they will greatly enhance the ability to
monitor ports, border crossings, and vehicle cargoes for hidden SNM. What remains elusive is
practical detection schemes at ranges greater than 100m and identification of illicit activities
involving SNM.
There are copious reports summarizing the state of the art and future research directions in
radiation detection. 27,28,29 Instead of repeating and summarizing the extensive discussions found
in those documents, the Task Force chose to summarize the status of radiation detection
technology for the main applications of interest and refer the reader to those documents for
much of the background technical information.
Close‐in Monitoring of SNM. Applications include on‐site and IAEA‐type inspections where
close‐in access is possible. In this case, there is a need for improved measurement systems for
identification and quantification of SNM in a variety of material types and configurations.
Examples of promising research areas include high‐resolution gamma‐ray spectrometers
operating at room temperature; improved neutron coincidence counting and neutron
multiplicity measurements; correlated measurements of fission gammas and neutrons; and
advanced micro‐calorimetry.
Hidden SNM at Ports, Borders, and in Vehicle Cargoes. As noted previously, a tremendous
effort to develop radiation detection equipment for these applications has occurred since
September 11. Passive gamma and neutron instrumentation has been deployed overseas (e.g.,
as part of DOE’s Megaports program). The Department of Homeland Security has deployed
fixed‐site radiation detection and radiography equipment at U.S. ports and borders. Portable
radiation search equipment has been shared with partners through the Proliferation Security
Initiative. The next generation of radiation detection instruments with improved performance
for these applications is in the pipeline of testing and qualification for deployment over the next
several years.
Operations in Contested Areas. A variety of passive gamma and neutron radiation detectors
are now available for operations in denied areas, primarily for troop protection where the
presence of radiation is anticipated. Portable radiation detection equipment for aircraft and
ground vehicles has been demonstrated under battlefield conditions. The concept of operations
For example:
27 NNSA, “Special Nuclear Materials Detection Program: Radiation Sensors and Sources Roadmap,” NA22‐OPD‐01‐
2010 (recommended as one of the most comprehensive)
28 Congressional Research Service, “Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials:Science, Technologies,
Obervations,” R40154, June 4, 2010
29 JASONS, “Concealed Nuclear Weapons,” JSR‐03‐130(2003); “Active Interrogation,” JSR‐09‐2‐2 (2009); “Lifetime
Extension Program (LEP) Executive Summary,” JSR‐09‐334E (2009)
DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 5: Improve the Tools: Access, Sense, Assess | 55
Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies
UNCLASSIFIED