monitoring

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DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
nuclear weapon state, thereby proliferating not only weapons possession, but also technology
and knowledge.
Each scenario node could play an elemental role in many other scenarios – e.g., the theft of a
weapon could be a common step in several distinct scenarios. The nodes are therefore linked in
a network of connections that becomes a framework for systematically developing and
analyzing an entire family of scenarios in the M&V problem space. Figure A‐2 illustrates the
complete scenario framework, rotated to fit the page, while Appendix B provides a larger view of
the framework.
As shown in Figure A‐3, scenarios generally evolve as one traces from top to bottom, following
the directed graph towards consequences. The left side demonstrates scenarios that can lead
to movement of weapons themselves from NWS to other actors. The center details scenarios
that can lead to the proliferation of NW technology and knowledge, and the right hand side
covers compromise of weapons usable nuclear material (WUNM) and associated technology.
The long vertical chain in the middle‐right illustrates the evolution of non‐state actors towards
unconventional attack with nuclear weapons. Consequences in the scenario framework include
blackmail, attack, or simply the emergence of a new nuclear‐armed state.
Within the scenario framework, blue‐colored nodes indicate “macro” nodes, or nodes that are
easily decomposed into a common set of sub‐nodes. For the purposes of this work, the only set
of sub‐nodes explored is the “movement sub‐space.” This sub‐space corresponds to movement
through the origin region, across international boundaries, through global commons, and into
the target region. The movement sub‐space is laid out in the blue box on the right hand side of
the framework diagram.
Real‐world events could easily be interpreted as a signal that a scenario in the framework is
playing out, although there is actually no nefarious activity. It is very important to consider
these degenerate scenarios, in addition to actual threat scenarios, when analyzing potential
solutions as it is likely the bulk of actual signals and information will be from situations that are
not actually leading to nuclear attacks. For example, the nuisance alarm problem in radiation
detectors that are monitoring commerce streams plays a large role in the overall cost,
effectiveness, and operation of those systems. Operational and analytical understanding of
such false positives leads to an understanding of the full suite of information and analysis
required for high confidence detection.
DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Appendix A: Unabridged Description | 82
Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies
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