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UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE resources on “rest of world” coverage if/when concerns arise. International or multilateral verification activities provide independent data to support intervention efforts in cases of noncompliance. The Safeguards system of the IAEA will need added resources and technical advances to deal with the effects of a global nuclear energy expansion to ensure a robust detection capability for any misuse. Should future arms reductions or other regimes or initiatives, such as Global Nuclear Lockdown and/or a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, require the IAEA to monitor a much more extensive set of facilities and/or materials, the existing Safeguards regime will have to shoulder an increase in the demand for strong but efficient monitoring and verification capabilities. Providing confidence that treaty obligations are being fulfilled while protecting sensitive information is a technical challenge common to both warhead verification and safeguards at commercial facilities, and one for which there are not yet widely accepted solutions. 2.3. Experience in Cooperation Outside the NPT: The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program The CTR program was begun in 1993 in order to assist the Russians and the republics of the former Soviet Union to reduce the threat of a nuclear weapon accident or loss and meet their commitments to the original Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Also known as the Nunn‐Lugar program, 14 the CTR program permitted the Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan to fulfill agreements to return their nuclear weapons to Russia and become nuclear weapons free states, reducing by three the number of governments that possessed operational nuclear weapons. The program also enabled Russia to meet its commitments to START. The United States, by partnering with the Russian Defense Ministry to destroy missiles, bombers and submarines, helped ensure that the Russians reduced the numbers of delivery vehicles agreed to under the START Treaty. The CTR program also built facilities and provided security systems to store nuclear materials and secure operational nuclear weapons. 15 Funding was also provided to support Russian nuclear scientists with technical work in order to mitigate the concern that they might otherwise sell their expertise to other nations who are intent on building their own nuclear weapons capability. Participants on both sides agree that greater transparency and 14 Then Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Richard Lugar initiated the program at the request of Secretary William Perry and Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter. Both Nunn and Lugar have remained active participants in the program over the years, visiting CTR sites in the former Soviet Union and guiding and encouraging aggressive conduct of CTR activities. They have also been instrumental in solving intergovernmental problems that otherwise would have delayed progress on the program. 15 In addition, the CTR program assisted the Russians in making a best effort to meet its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The United States assisted the Russians in building chemical demilitarization facilities that destroyed thousands of chemical weapons. It has been expanded in recent years to secure biological agents of concern, as well as expand disease monitoring capabilities in selected international regions. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 2: Cooperative Regimes| 22 Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE stability were achieved between the United States and Russia through the execution of the Nunn‐Lugar program. 2.4. Toward an International Cooperation and Transparency Regime Currently the IAEA monitors all declared stocks of SNM in states that are signatories to the NPT and occasionally SNM offered up as excess material in weapon states. The bilateral Safeguards agreements that provide the legal basis for safeguards implementation, require that the information collected be considered sensitive and not be shared with other states. 16 Extending protocols to include the monitoring of nuclear weapons and weapon components worldwide coupled to sharing of the information with all international parties who have agreed to cooperate should be the ultimate goal. In order to get to that point, a long period of trust building through a number of intermediate steps will be required. The Task Force examined the experience base to understand how to get started in such a process and then developed a proposal for a phased approach. The Task Force started with an examination of the recent history of proposals and negotiations for how best to obtain mutual agreements on M&V technologies in the future. One of the best historic examples was the Cooperative Safe, Secure Dismantlement (SSD) talks of 1991‐1994 (bilateral discussions between the United States and the Russian Federation). The talks had made significant progress towards a joint agreement for radiation detection equipment that could be used to establish the fact that an object presented for dismantlement was in fact a nuclear warhead. Although these talks were terminated without a formal agreement being consummated, there were enthusiastic beliefs on both sides that they had “come close” to developing radiation detectors and related instruments and procedures that could adequately determine the amounts of SNM [either Highly‐Enriched Uranium (HEU) or Plutonium (Pu)] with sufficient accuracy to establish that there were indeed weapon‐like quantities present. The remaining barrier to be overcome was to ensure that sensitive information (such as specific design details of the devices presented) could not be transferred. The approach being pursued during the SSD talks focused on the use of potential “Information Barriers,” such as templates provided by the inspected party on CDs or magnetic disks at the point of inspection, which would then be used to convert the measured data into kilogram amounts of SNM, but which would not reveal geometric internal details of the device. That approach still had some difficulties prior to its being accepted, but there were serious efforts 16 The IAEA does publish the plutonium holdings of nine countries, the five declared weapons states as well as Japan, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland. This information is provided on a voluntary basis by the participants consistent with the “Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium” (INFCIRC/549). Such declarations might be a useful starting point upon which to build a more comprehensive transparency regime. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 2: Cooperative Regimes| 23 Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat UNCLASSIFIED
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