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UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 6.2.1. Why is a National Testing Capability for Monitoring and Verification Needed? There are many inter‐related reasons. The comprehensive monitoring regime the Task Force proposes is a system of systems that must work together, and is too complicated to plan/assess on paper and/or with piecemeal testing. Furthermore, experience shows that operators typically learn to use actual monitoring systems differently and often better than system design/analysis would predict. Two examples illustrate the point: • Past experience in radiation detection operations; e.g., Operation Morning Light (the 1978 deployment to search for and recover debris from a reactor‐powered Soviet RORSAT that re‐entered in northern Canada); and Navy experience in detection of shipboard nuclear weapons. In both cases, operators learned to reject clutter and spurious signals by identifying patterns inherent in their own operations and/or in the larger context. For example, in Morning Light, radiation signatures from the low‐grade uranium‐ore deposits that are ubiquitous in Northern Canada confounded the search operations in the first days. But operators identified the source of the spurious signals, and learned that the radiation signatures from these deposits rose and declined more slowly, as the search platforms flew across the terrain, than the radiation signatures of the point‐targets they were looking for, and could be sorted out on that basis; • Recent experience in the development of new‐generation tactical ISR in the Counter IED fight discussed elsewhere in this report; learning from operational experience in Iraq/Afghanistan (“on the job training”), has been coupled with iteration in experiments in various DoD testing and training facilities (e.g., the National Training Center [NTC]) to not only train deploying units but also to anticipate next steps in adversary tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). The need to learn from experimentation and experience is even greater in the areas addressed by this Task Force, where an adaptive adversary and/or one with sophisticated denial and deception is likely to be involved. The advantages of a testing capability are many and compelling. It would or could: • Provide a focal point for planning, iterating/adapting, and operating the system of systems; • Help integrate the technically disparate and organizationally disaggregated activities that comprise the national monitoring system; • Better couple developers and users and provide an experimental basis for net assessment and risk management; • Provide ground‐truth performance metrics for technologies and operations, in part as a basis for future spirals; • Stimulate sorely needed new ideas; • Expose “subcritical” programs because planning experiments would force development of concrete requirements and CONOPs; DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 6: Experiment to Iterate and Adapt: National Testing Capability | 66 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • Elevate attention to red‐teaming of monitoring systems. On a broader scale, it could help build international understanding and cooperation on monitoring systems. In particular, testing operations could be a vehicle for confidence building and transparency assessment and promotion, and could also contribute to dissuasion and deterrence. 6.2.2. What Would a Testing Capability Consist Of? The testing capability would have four interdependent parts: 1) the ranges and facilities (real and virtual); 2) the information/data management systems (data flows from and to sensors, information flows within the analysis/fusion systems, and command/control data/information flows); 3) a standing “White Team”; and 4) a standing Red Teaming activity. The ranges and facilities would consist of a distributed, netted set of: • Operating real‐world facilities (e.g. PANTEX, a power reactor, port of New York, SFO, the URENCO enrichment plant); • Real test facilities (e.g. NTC, Nevada National Security Site [NNSS]) with space for largescale operations and/or use of radioactive materials; • Simulated facilities/operations. This set of facilities and networks would eventually cover the full range of nuclear threat and treaty‐related capabilities and activities, including: labs, production, industrial base, distributed weapons and materials storage, deployment, distributed field operations. The set would also be broad enough to bring into play “patterns of life” in peace, crisis, and perhaps war. The facilities should include remote areas, areas like “the South Bronx”, air, and at‐sea operations. There should be the capability to use real SNM. Some facilities and ranges might be overseas, including facilities that would be the actual subject of monitoring in future treaties. Information and data flows are the second crucial part of the testing capability because they comprise the essence of monitoring. The monitoring system itself is about information; monitoring the data/information flows in treaty‐partner and/or adversary systems and operations is a crucial function of the monitoring system. The testing capability must thus include both blue and (hypothesized actual or simulated) red information/data management systems and networks. Such information/data systems––real or simulated––can be very expensive, and their development and iteration very time‐consuming. Fortunately, rapid prototyping, testing capabilities, and iteration for such data management systems have been developed for other applications. It appears possible to readily adapt such testing for the information management aspects of the nuclear monitoring testing capability. Moreover, the testing capability systems can evolve to become the actual operational systems. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 6: Experiment to Iterate and Adapt: National Testing Capability | 67 Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies UNCLASSIFIED
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