monitoring

UNCLASSIFIED
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
As introduced earlier in this chapter, the first use of the national M&V test‐bed should be for
both arms‐control and threat‐assessment monitoring of dual‐capable systems. The key is to
start small in both the scope of the facilities/ranges involved and the complexity of the
scenarios, and then grow in both dimensions as national monitoring capabilities grow and need
to be integrated. The goal should also be to start soon––the problem space is too complex to
be designed perfectly a priori.
As a first step, DTRA should analyze use of wide‐area, persistent ISR/reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) for monitoring of dual‐capable systems to support
both treaty‐monitoring and threat‐assessment. Pros and cons should be developed comparing
various applications of this first step, including for example, future warhead‐counting treaties,
assessment of Russian dual‐capable systems in general, and assessment of China’s DC systems
along the Taiwan Straits.
Based on that analysis, the next step should be to plan, jointly among DoD, DOE, and the IC, a
first, relatively simple experiment in detail; for example, using an ODIN‐like system to find a
single dual‐capable platform operating in “move‐and‐hide” mode, at NTC and/or NNSS. (The
latter would allow experimentation with real SNM signatures.) This would be a relatively low
cost initial effort, but it would get started on an important problem. Even this first small step
should involve red‐teaming, and should be planned by the White‐Team using the scenariogenerator
described in Chapter 4. Various sensor mixes and adaptive sensor/platform CONOPs,
posited by a “solutions team” also described in Chapter 4, should be explored. The product
should be a well‐understood design for one component of the future nuclear monitoring
system of systems, along with options for operating that component.
Following success with this single‐focused monitoring application, the experimentation
campaign should add two, three, and more elements of the “pattern of life” for the red nuclear
enterprise. The results should not only inform CONOPs development, but also identify
intelligence gaps where collection assets might be focused.
For all of the above, it will be important to partner with at least one geographical COCOM, and
to be guided by a steering group of military and technical experts who have made such
undertakings a success in the past.
6.5. Recommendations: National Monitoring Testing Capability
The Task Force believes that even with substantial investment in all other elements of its
proposed “whats” and “hows”, the U.S. will likely see only marginal improvement in monitoring
capabilities without the national testing capability. While the idea of “testing capability” could
suggest an expensive undertaking, the Task Force has been careful, as it has in other parts of
this report, to make recommendations that build upon existing capabilities or shift investment
priorities within existing portfolios. In the case of the testing capability, the communities
DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 6: Experiment to Iterate and Adapt: National Testing Capability | 74
Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies
UNCLASSIFIED