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UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE<br />
Utilization of risk as an end‐to‐end problem space metric comes with a set of inherent<br />
challenges as well. Common criticisms of formal risk assessment methodologies in decision<br />
processes include:<br />
• Conflating stochastic processes and adversary decisions – Rigorous risk assessment<br />
methodologies rely on estimates of the probabilities of events of concern. In systems<br />
where outcomes are determined by truly random processes, this works quite well,<br />
especially when the system is well characterized. However, well characterized stochastic<br />
processes do not govern intelligent adversaries; instead, they make informed decisions.<br />
Although frequently used, probabilistic representations of adversary decisions are, for<br />
the most part, meaningless. However, characterization of uncertainty about adversary<br />
decisions in a probabilistic analysis can be beneficial, if carefully developed.<br />
• Focusing on absolute values rather than relative impacts and sensitivities – The<br />
absolute values of risk are, in most formulations, arbitrary, as they are built upon the<br />
assumptions and values of the analyst or decision maker for whom they are<br />
constructed. Additionally, the models upon which risk is calculated often cannot be truly<br />
validated. Therefore, the absolute values of risk are less important and somewhat<br />
meaningless, while the differences and relative comparisons can be more telling.<br />
• Inability to define “acceptable” – A key component of making decisions in a risk‐based<br />
framework is to define acceptable risks within the timeframe of the investment decision<br />
itself. If “acceptable” cannot be defined, the goal becomes to simply minimize risk,<br />
expending all resources, rather than achieve minimum risk using appropriate resources.<br />
• Examining risk trade‐offs too narrowly – One of the most common criticisms of<br />
implementations of risk‐based approaches is the lack of definition around uncertainties.<br />
Especially in problems of high uncertainty, the error in risk calculations can be so large,<br />
that close trade‐offs can be interpreted as essentially the same. Not having well defined<br />
uncertainties can allow false comparisons to drive decision processes. At the same<br />
time, ignoring the uncertainty (or error bars) in the analysis denies they opportunity to<br />
prioritize potential efforts to improve understanding.<br />
• Misuse of probability and statistics – While it may seem like an elementary mistake,<br />
bad assumptions or interpretations, especially around dependence or independence,<br />
can lead to mathematical operations and inferences that may be numerically correct,<br />
yet meaningless––or worse, incorrectly calculated.<br />
In the face of those challenges, it is certainly possible, although difficult, to articulate a risk<br />
metric that serves as an end‐to‐end metric within the M&V problem space for evaluating<br />
proposed solution architectures. It may not be necessary to always use the classical definitions<br />
of risk as the primary measure. Most risk studies use the arithmetic product of probabilities of<br />
occurrence and consequences as the standard definition of risk. However, the strictest<br />
interpretation of risk may not always be the most useful or accurate. Instead, it is possible to<br />
use measures that are proximate to risk when performing analyses. For example, other studies<br />
have proposed and formalized using assessments of the difficulty an adversary would face in<br />
DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Appendix A: Unabridged Description | 89<br />
Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies<br />
UNCLASSIFIED