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UNCLASSIFIED<br />
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE<br />
within each of the major government programs because it is possible that one may produce<br />
breakthroughs in cost and/or performance, but the Task Force found none that were<br />
sufficiently mature to warrant a major ramp‐up in investments.<br />
The major shortcomings across the federal efforts are two: (1) there is no integrated<br />
mechanism for setting R&D priorities across the programs or for allocating funding along such<br />
lines; and (2) operational requirements to measure the readiness of a given technology or<br />
operational system for transition to a specific application are often lacking, such that much of<br />
the radiation detection technology that is developed is never transferred to operational use.<br />
The task force believes that a more unified “national” technology roadmap can aid both the<br />
individual agencies and the efficiency of the overall federal programs. In addition,<br />
understanding the interplay between possible radiation detection capabilities and the broad<br />
range of possible (other) <strong>monitoring</strong> technologies, operations, and scenarios should be<br />
improved within both the R&D and operational communities.<br />
5.3.5. Key Findings: Radiation Detection<br />
The task force did not try to down‐select or set research and development priorities among the<br />
various technologies since the wide range of applications often calls for differing solutions.<br />
Rather, it focused on identifying mechanisms that would enable the various agencies to do their<br />
work more effectively and also produce a better overall federal approach to radiation<br />
detection. Our specific findings are as follows:<br />
• Operational requirements to measure the practicality and readiness of a given<br />
technology or operational system for transition to a specific application are too often<br />
lacking. As a result, much of the radiation detection technology that is developed is<br />
never transferred to operational use.<br />
• Technology and concept of operations (CONOPs) are both workable problems for New<br />
START treaty verification. Intrusiveness and information protection must be addressed.<br />
• Beyond New Start, the requirement for <strong>monitoring</strong> will begin to emphasize individual<br />
warhead or bomb counting; solutions that simultaneously verify the presence of a<br />
warhead without revealing sensitive classified design information will be needed.<br />
• There are technically plausible approaches at ports and borders for detecting plutonium<br />
and radiological materials; shielded uranium requires continuing research. Several<br />
systems are currently in the pipeline for deployment during the next several years. All<br />
methods involve trades among CONOPs and cost‐benefit choices, which must be<br />
resolved before deployment.<br />
• Radiation detection will have a limited role in finding loose SNM or theater nuclear<br />
weapons; however, when a suspect object is found, radiation detectors should be able<br />
to identify and characterize it.<br />
• Managed access at national nuclear facilities and test ranges is needed for technical and<br />
operational development of radiation detectors.<br />
DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 5: Improve the Tools: Access, Sense, Assess | 57<br />
Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Verification Technologies<br />
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