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UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE being expended by both the United States and Russian participants to find acceptable solutions. Methods such as this one could be the first step to multilateral cooperation that could include non‐nuclear weapons states. Over the past decade, programs such as the United States‐Russia Warhead Safety and Security Exchange (WSSX), and the United States‐Russia‐IAEA Tri‐lateral Initiative have explored transparency methods and ways to protect sensitive information. In a recent exchange meeting on this topic in January of 2011 between scientists of the Russian and United States National Academies, both sides expressed strong interest in finding ways to complete the search for mutual agreement on measurement devices that could overcome the difficulties listed above, convinced that these will be essential for verification of future nuclear agreements. Efforts are currently underway to pursue a United States‐Russian agreement to allow such cooperative work to be reinvigorated. In addition, there was a meeting of United States and Russian nuclear weapons lab directors late in 2012, and both sides spoke favorably of finding a way to renew cooperative work, that was lost when the Lab‐to‐Lab efforts fell off during the Russian/Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) reorganization. During its deliberations, the Task Force learned there has been additional U.S. thinking and work that would utilize film recording, rather than direct counting apparatus. There are strong beliefs that the needed systems can be achieved by employing random scanning techniques which could average out geometrical details, while preserving the total assay/inventory of special nuclear material amounts. The positive experience of these and other examples led members of the Task Force to conceive an overall approach, and to recommend that the U.S. pursue joint development efforts for “Building Cooperation and Transparency.” The Task Force envisions a multi‐year effort, which can pay large dividends in terms of a universal transparency that would improve strategic and tactical stability against nuclear war among all nuclear‐weapons states, as well as achieve enhanced confidence building for nonproliferation efforts. We endorse these approaches, and outline some of the details for the proposed phased initiative below. Realizing that there are no perfect transparency regimes, there are still many advantages that can result when nations can achieve full reciprocity in monitoring both nuclear weapons and nuclear materials that might otherwise be diverted for weapons use. All parties would benefit from the national security stability that would ensue from having transparent knowledge of the numbers/types of other nations’ nuclear arsenals, while each nation in turn makes the knowledge of their own SNM and/or nuclear weapons inventories available to the others. The Task Force envisioned that the same techniques could be utilized by inspectors for routine inspections, dismantlement verification, and warhead destruction monitoring. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 2: Cooperative Regimes| 24 Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE There are of course essential criteria that must be met before such a regime can be successful. Of primary importance, the security of storage sites and the security of stored weapons or materials should not be undermined or even weakened by the agreed upon inspection processes to be used. Similarly, successful transparency should reveal neither national secrets, such as specific locations of storage sites or security design techniques, nor vulnerabilities within the weapons designs. Achieving acceptance by all parties as to the permissible level of intrusiveness during the inspections, while preserving the effectiveness of the security measures employed by the inspected parties, will require independent agreement and confidence in these factors by all of the parties. The Task Force fully understands that the task proposed will not be easy nor will it be accomplished soon. However, the Task Force does believe that the times are now propitious to move forward on a path to develop universal transparency regimes that can simultaneously fulfill these goals and requirements through an international process for achieving universal knowledge of nuclear weapon inventories and SNM inventories, and that the U.S. should lead in such an effort. Indeed the U.S. has already declassified the size of its current nuclear arsenal. The Task Force proposal has four phases, each with subparts that involve cooperative development efforts with a multiplicity of other states. Phase 1. Bilateral Cooperative Developments/Evaluations with P‐5 States. The journey should begin with a series of bilateral efforts among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P‐5) nations (United States, Russia, UK, China, France) to jointly develop, evaluate, and improve monitoring equipment and recording methods to demonstrate the capabilities needed for warhead verification. Particular emphasis should be placed on achieving acceptable levels of “non‐intrusiveness.” In order to win agreement for use of any approach by all of these parties, it will be important to prove that sensitive information will not be revealed—either directly or through collateral or surreptitious means. The model of the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) provides an excellent template for how similar bilateral cooperative efforts, which the Task Force envisions here, could proceed. The JVE was carried out cooperatively between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in 1987 and 1988 for the purpose of creating mutually agreed upon methods for both on‐site measurements and on‐site verification systems in support of the series of bilateral Nuclear Testing Talks. 17 When successfully demonstrated and accepted by the parties, these monitoring systems could be used for verification of nuclear weapons treaties, for authentication of declared stockpiles, for verification of dismantlement, and ultimately for verification of the destructions of warheads. At some point, the bilateral nature of this phase should move to multilateral cooperation across the P‐5. 17 The 25th Anniversary of the Joint Verification Experiment was commemorated jointly between the U.S. and Russia in the early fall of 2013 at the site of the experiment. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 2: Cooperative Regimes| 25 Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat UNCLASSIFIED
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